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PEOPLE v. SCOTT* & PEOPLE v. KETA:**
"DEMOCRACY BEGINS IN CONVERSATION""**
Eve Cary**** & Mary R. Falk*****
INTRODUCTION
In April, 1992 an acrimoniously divided New York Court of
Appeals decided two significant search and seizure cases, People
v. Scott,1 which involved the warrantless search of posted unde-
veloped land for marijuana, and People v. Keta,2 which involved
a warrantless administrative search of an automobile disman-
tling business. The cases are important, first because they estab-
lish broad protection for the citizens of New York against un-
lawful searches and seizures; and second, because in so doing,
the court of appeals rejected outright United States Supreme
Court precedent on the identical issues in Oliver v. United
States' and New York v. Burger4 under the federal Constitution
* 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
** 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
* Asked what his long life had taught him, John Dewey is said to have replied, "I
have learned that democracy begins in conversation." James Boyd White, Judicial
Criticism, 20 GA. L. REv. 835 (1986).
**** Eve Cary, Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. New
York University School of Law, J.D.; Sarah Lawrence College, B.A.
***** Mary R. Falk, Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. New York University
School of Law, J.D.; Sarah Lawrence College, B.A. The research and writing of this Arti-
cle were supported by grants from the summer stipend program of Brooklyn Law School.
Special thanks are due to June Parris for her patient help with manuscript preparation.
1 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). The New York Court of
Appeals held that "where landowners fence or post 'No Trespassing' signs on their pri-
vate property or, by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permit-
ted, the expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that they will be free
from unwarranted intrusions is reasonable" within the meaning of article I, section 12, of
the New York State Constitution. Id. at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
2 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). The New York Court of
Appeals held that article I, section 12 forbids "random warrantless searches of vehicle
dismantling businesses to determine whether such businesses are trafficking in stolen
automobile parts." Id.
2 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In Oliver the Supreme Court held varrantless searches of
posted land like that in Scott to be constitutional.
482 U.S. 691 (1987). In Burger the Court upheld an "administrative" search simi-
lar to the one in Keta.
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and instead relied solely on the New York State constitution.5
Both New York decisions triggered strong dissents.6 While
the dissenters were critical of the outcome in both cases, it was
not the search and seizure issues that generated the controversy
among the members of New York's highest court. Rather, the
question that seriously divided them-not for the first
time-was the question of methodology: when may a state court
legitimately reject a decision of the United States Supreme
Court interpreting the federal Constitution and use its own state
constitution to raise the floor of protection afforded individual
rights?7
The opinions in Scott and Keta are both edifying and cau-
tionary, at one and the same time examples of how courts should
and should not behave. The court's search and seizure discus-
sions are characterized by logic, reason, adherence to precedent,
and appropriate judicial tone. In dramatic contrast, the major-
ity's discussion of the methodology of state constitutional adju-
dication is non-existent, the concurrence's analysis is elusive and
the dissent's answer consists of little more than invective.
Part I of this Article summarizes the majority opinion in
People v. Scott after providing federal constitutional back-
ground; part II does the same for People v. Keta. Part III sum-
marizes the omnibus dissent and concurrence in both cases. The
double aspect of the cases dictated a two-part analysis. Part IV
analyzes Scott and Keta as search and seizure law, concluding
that they are not only good decisions-that is, principled exten-
sions of what came before-but also good opinions, texts that
' Section 12 of article I provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
6 79 N.Y.2d 474, 506, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 940 (1992) (Bel.
lacosa, J., dissenting).
" All of the many courts or commentators that have written on the subject agree
that a state supreme court has an unassailable right to interpret its own state constitu-
tion. Although state court decisions interpreting the federal Constitution are subject to
review by the Supreme Court, state court decisions interpreting state constitutions are
subject to Supreme Court review only for violations of federal law. See, e.g., Judith S.
Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 400
n.2 (1987); Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law
Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 588 (1986) (reviewing DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw: THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE (1985)).
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invite the reader to a "conversation in which democracy flour-
ishes."8 Part V analyzes the state constitutional methodology of
Scott and Keta, concluding that while they are good deci-
sions-that is, the court of appeals acted wisely in granting
broader protection under the state constitution than the Su-
preme Court did under the federal Constitution-they are nev-
ertheless inadequate opinions because they fail to adopt any in-
telligible theory of state constitutional adjudication on which
litigators and judges can rely.
This Article concludes that although any clearly articulated
approach to state constitutional adjudication in cases like Scott
and Keta9 would be preferable to the ambiguity and rancor pre-
vailing in the recent decisions of the court of appeals, there is
one "better" method for determining whether departure from
Supreme Court precedent is warranted.10 In brief, such a meth-
odology would require a state court to conduct a careful evalua-
tion of the Supreme Court's decision, exploring the full range of
available arguments. This evaluation would result either in
adoption or in principled and reasoned rejection. Having dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's rationale in a way accessible to
readers, a court that disagreed would then be free to use its own
state constitution to grant broader protection. Although rea-
soned disagreement as a basis for departure from Supreme
Court precedent has traditionally been disparaged by courts and
commentators,11 this Article argues that it is the only methodol-
ogy consistent with the state courts' unquestioned historical role
as "primary guardian[s]" of individual liberties.'2
In its painstaking analyses and ultimate rejection of Oliver
and Burger, the New York Court of Appeals has succeeded ad-
mirably in doing precisely what this Article advocates. Its fail-
ure, however, is in refusing to adopt explicitly the methodology
it has in fact employed, making it impossible for participants in
8 James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L Rv. 835, 847, 867 (1986).
8 That is, cases in which individual rights provided by parallel provisions of a state
constitution and the federal Constitution are at stake and the precise issue has been
decided by the United States Supreme Court.
10 See infra notes 361-72 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 506, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 940
(1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); James Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Consti-
tutionalism, 90 MicuL L. REv. 761, 772 (1992).
12 Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 739 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
1993]
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the state judicial system to engage in meaningful discourse
about the state constitution.
I. PEOPLE V. SCOTT
A. Background: "Open Fields" and the Fourtli Amendment"5
In 1924 the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a
field by federal agents, declaring that "the special protection ac-
corded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open
fields. ' 14 This decision was based in its entirety on a literal read-
ing of the language of the Fourth Amendment: land is not a per-
son, house, paper, or effect. Three years later, holding that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to electronic eavesdropping,
the Court endorsed Hester's literalism in Olmstead v. United
States,15 further ruling there that in the absence of trespass into
a constitutionally protected area, no search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment occurs. Thus, under Hester and Olm-
stead a warrantless search of land was constitutionally prohib-
ited only if it involved a physical trespass by a government
agent into the residence itself or its "curtilage," a narrow consti-
tutionally protected zone of real property surrounding the
home.16
In United States v. Katz, 7 decided in 1967, the Court
abandoned this property-oriented, physical-trespass approach,
declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The conduct
at issue in Katz was the warrantless surveillance of calls made
from a public telephone booth. According to the Court, the issue
was not whether a telephone booth is a constitutionally pro-
tected area, but whether the defendant's privacy had been vio-
lated. The Court concluded that the surveillance "violated the
privacy upon which [defendant] justifiably relied and thus con-
stituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
" This discussion and that in Part II.A, infra, occupy neutral ground in the debate
of the New York Court of Appeals; the dissenters had no quarrel with the majority's
summary of Fourth Amendment law here or in Keta.
" Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
277 U.S. 438 (1927).
,e Id. at 465-66.
17 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[Vol. 58:1279
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Amendment."' 8 Katz mandates a two-step "expectation-of-pri-
vacy" test that asks first, whether the individual has manifested
a subjective expectation of privacy from the challenged search,
and second, if so, whether society would find that expectation
objectively reasonable.19
Seventeen years later, in United States v. Oliver,20 amid
speculation that Katz had overruled Hester, the Court revisited
the question of Fourth Amendment protection against warrant-
less searches of land outside the curtilage. The search in Oliver
differed from that in Hester in one respect: the landowner had
surrounded the perimeter of his secluded, undeveloped land
with "no trespassing" signs. However, these precautions did not
dissuade the Court from putting a categorical end to speculation
about the "open fields" doctrine. Reaffirming Hester, the Court
concluded that for land outside the curtilage of the home, an
owner is entitled to no Fourth Amendment protection, not even
for secluded property surrounded by fences or "no trespassing"
signs."
The Oliver majority announced two bases for its holding.
First, the Court returned to Hester's literal reading of the
Fourth Amendment, which explicitly guarantees the security of
the people "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," but
does not mention open land.2 In an attempt to resolve the
seeming inconsistency between Hester and Katz, the Court held
that the Katz expectation-of-privacy analysis would continue to
be applied to the residence and its curtilage. But this raised the
further question of whether logic compelled the extension of pri-
vacy analysis to fenced or posted land. This question the Court
dismissed in its second rationale: under Katz an owner of such
land could have no legally cognizable expectation of privacy be-
cause an expectation of privacy based on fencing or posting,
even in the most secluded areas, as a matter of law, is not one
that our society recognizes as reasonable. That is, the owner's
expectations could never pass the second, "objective" part of the
Katz test. The Court held:
'a Id. at 353.
19 Id. at 360-62.
20 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
21 Id. at 179.
2 Id. at 176-77.
1993]
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There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activi-
ties, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. More-
over, as a practical matter these lands are usually accessible to the
public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial
structure would not be. It is not generally true that fences or "No
Trespassing" signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields
in rural areas. . . [Thus,] the asserted expectation of privacy in "open
fields" 23 is not an expectation that "society recognizes as
reasonable."
24
Finally, the Court seemingly added a new twist to Katz in
Oliver: a landowner's expectation need not only be genuinely
held and objectively reasonable-it must be "legitimate" as well.
Emphasizing the illicit nature of the activity sought to be kept
private by appellant Oliver (marijuana growing), rather than the
nature of the efforts to ensure privacy, the Court concluded that
expectations like his were not "legitimate.
25
In 1988 the New York Court of Appeals applied the Katz
expectation-of-privacy test to a Hester-like case, a warrantless
search of unfenced, unposted land outside the curtilage and
found no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
or article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution." The court
of appeals reasoned that no subjective expectation of privacy
(the first step in the Katz analysis) is demonstrated by a land-
owner who fails to indicate that the public is not welcome. The
court left for another day whether article I, section 12 forbids
warrantless search of lands fenced or otherwise marked in a way
that demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy.21
In People v. Scott that day came and saw a rancorously di-
vided court decline to adopt Oliver as the law of New York
under article I, section 12 on the ground that Oliver "does not
adequately protect fundamental constitutional rights."28 Writing
for the majority, Judge.Hancock was joined by Judges Kaye, Al-
exander, and Titone. Judge Bellacosa wrote an infuriated, scold-
ing omnibus dissent to Scott and Keta in which Judge Simons
and Chief Judge Wachtler joined. The four judges of the majori-
23 The Court uses "open fields" to refer to any undeveloped land. Id. at 180 n.11.
24 Id. at 179.
25 Id. at 178.
2 People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 523 N.E.2d 291, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1988).
2 Id. at 556, 523 N.E.2d at 293, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
'8 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
[Vol. 58: 1279
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ties were reunited in an omnibus concurrence written by Judge
Kaye.29 The majority opinion is concerned almost entirely with
the substantive issue: whether the Oliver rule is a good rule. The
dissent does not explicitly quarrel with the majority's conclusion
that Oliver insufficiently protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Rather, the dissent rebukes the majority for the
way in which it reaches its decision, specifically the criteria it
did and did not apply, and how it applied them. The concur-
rence is the majority's indignant reply to the dissent's charge
that the majority's decision is politically motivated and without
support in reason or precedent.
B. The Facts of Scott
Guy Scott pled guilty to criminal possession of marijuana in
the first degree following the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence of marijuana cultivation seized by state police on the
execution of a search warrant. Scott had argued that the warrant
was defective because it was based on evidence obtained in vio-
lation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the federal
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the New York Constitu-
tion. The search warrant was based on evidence obtained by a
private citizen and by a police officer, both of whom entered
Scott's property after observing conspicuously posted "no tres-
passing" signs.30
The appellate division affirmed Scott's conviction, agreeing
with the hearing court that his act of posting "no trespassing"
signs about every twenty to thirty feet around the perimeter of
his property, which consisted of 165 acres of rural, hilly, unde-
veloped fields and woodlands that were uncultivated except for
some 200 marijuana plants, did not establish a constitutionally
cognizable expectation of privacy.31 Scott was granted leave to
appeal to the court of appeals, which reversed his conviction.
C. The Majority Opinion
The majority begins its analysis with a lengthy exposition of
29 Since the omnibus concurrence answers the omnibus dissent rather than advanc-
ing reservations or alternative arguments, it is summarized here after both majority
opinions and the omnibus dissent. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
"o Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 479, 593 N.E.2d at 1330-31, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23.
31 Id. at 478-79, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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the Hester-Katz evolution and a summary of the Court's reason-
ing in Oliver.32 The majority then proceeds to reject both bases
of Oliver, the first briefly and the second at length. Prelimina-
rily, however, the majority notes its conviction that the two
holdings are inconsistent with each other; that is, the literal
reading of the Fourth Amendment in Oliver cannot coexist with
Katz. The Scott majority agrees with Justice Marshall's dissent
in Oliver that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the ma-
jority's restricted reading of the Fourth Amendment's language
and the Katz holding that a telephone conversation is constitu-
tionally protected although "neither a public telephone booth
nor a conversation conducted therein can fairly be described as a
person, house, paper, or effect." 33
Agreeing that both the Fourth Amendment and article I,
section 12 speak of "persons, houses, papers, and effects," the
court of appeals nonetheless rejects outright the Supreme
Court's literal reading of that text as excluding "land. '34 This
rejection is based on the history of section 12, which though
''sparse," is in any event different from the history of the Fourth
Amendment, and can thus justify a different reading.3 Further,
although the language in question is identical to that of the
Fourth Amendment, section 12 is not identical to the Fourth
Amendment. Section 12 contains a clause not found in the
Fourth Amendment, a clause providing protection against the
warrantless interception of electronic communications." Thus,
the majority concludes, the Supreme Court's literal textual anal-
ysis is simply irrelevant to its interpretation of section 12. 37 The
majority also rejects Oliver's "categorical" holding that an ex-
pectation of privacy in fenced or posted land outside the curti-
lage is not one that society recognizes as reasonable .3  To the
32 This review is substantially similar in effect and extent to part I.A, supra. Scott,
at 481-85, 593 N.E.2d at 1332-34, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 924-26.
" Id. at 485, 593 N.E.2d at 1334-35, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27 (citing United States v.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 185 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
79 N.Y.2d at 485-86, 593 N.E.2d at 1334-35, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27.
" Article I, section 12 was originally Civil Rights Law section 8. It was added to the
New York Constitution in 1938.
" This clause constituted a rejection of the (now obsolete) Olmstead rule exempting
electronic communications from Fourth Amendment protection. Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1924); see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
" Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
38 Id.
[Vol. 58:1279
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contrary, "[a] Constitutional rule which permits state agents to
invade private lands for no reason at all-without permission
and in outright disregard of the owner's efforts to maintain pri-
vacy by fencing or posting signs-is one that we cannot accept
as adequately preserving fundamental rights of New York citi-
zens." '39 The Scott majority gives the following four reasons for
this rejection of Oliver.
First, the Oliver rule is contrary to New York law, particu-
larly search-and-seizure decisions following the Katz rationale.
New York courts have consistently adhered to the Katz rule
that it is persons and their privacy rights, not places, that are
protected from an unreasonable search dnd seizure.40 Oliver's
categorical no-expectation-of-privacy-in-open-land rule would
thus unsettle New York law, subverting protection of justifiable
expectations of privacy.4'
Second, the Oliver rule is inconsistent with what Justice
Brandeis called "the right to be let alone. 4 2 The right to pri-
vacy, this "core principle," is reflected not only in New York's
search-and-seizure jurisprudence, but in other case law and in
statutes such as those proscribing criminal trespass and permit-
ting the "posting" of land. 3 The majority further notes that
property rights generally reflect society's recognition that we
may act as we wish in certain areas. In particular, the right to
exclude the public is "one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights" in New York."
Third, the Oliver Court's use of the same illegal conduct
discovered by the disputed search as a factor justifying that
search is "troublesome.' ' 5 This boot-strapping justification for
illegal police conduct is incompatible with "New York's recogni-
tion of fairness as an essential concern in criminal jurispru-
dence," as is the "unbridled license" given law-enforcement
agents.'6
Finally, the Oliver rule offends New York's tradition of tol-
39 Id.
40 Id. at 488, 593 N.E.2d at 1336, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 487-88, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
43 Id.
" Id. at 487, 593 N.E.2d at 1336, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
41 Id. at 488, 593 N.E.2d at 1336, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
46 Id. at 488-90, 593 N.E.2d at 1336-37, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
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erance. According to the Scott majority, Oliver presupposes a
"conforming society" in which law-abiding persons have or do
nothing on their property that they would not want the world to
see. This is "foreign" to New York's tradition, memorialized in
our case law, of tolerating the unconventional, the bizarre, even
the offensive.4"
According to the majority, these several reasons more than
justify rejection of Oliver and "resort" to the state constitution
for the "adequate protection of fundamental rights. '48
Turning briefly to the criteria used in determining whether
to interpret New York's constitution more broadly than the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the analogous federal constitu-
tional provision, the Fourth Amendment, the Scott majority
concludes that the test is simply whether "under established
New York Law and traditions some greater degree of protection
must be given. ' 49 Recognizing that the dissent would impose
more and stricter criteria, the majority nevertheless "decline[s]
to adopt any rigid method of analysis which would, except in
unusual circumstances, require us to interpret provisions of the
State Constitution in 'lockstep' with the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of similarly worded provisions of the Federal
Constitution. ' 50
" Id. at 488-89, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
" Id. at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927. The majority cites the follow-
ing cases as precedent for this "resort" to New York's constitution: People v. Dunn, 77
N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990); People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224,
543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989); Matter of Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987);
People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1987); People v.
Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986); People v. Gokey, 60
N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1983); People v. Gleeson, 36 N.Y.2d 462,
330 N.E.2d 72, 369 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1975); see also People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 508
N.E.2d 903, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1987); People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 514
N.Y.S.2d 201 (1987); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d
618 (1985); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985);
People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982); People v. El.
well, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 406 N.E.2d 471, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1980). Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 480-
81, 593 N.E.2d at 1331-32, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24.
4 Scott, at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
Id. at 490, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
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H. PEOPLE V. KETA
A. Background: "Administrative" Searches and the Fourth
Amendment 51
In Franks v. Maryland51 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied only to
searches undertaken to procure evidence of criminality and not
to administrative inspections or searches undertaken to imple-
ment a regulatory scheme. 3 For example, because of the state's
interest in preventing fire safety code violations, neither a war-
rant nor probable cause were requirements for inspecting prem-
ises to insure compliance. The Court abandoned that position in
.Camara v. Municipal Court54 and See v. City of Seattle,05 how-
ever, holding that the Fourth Amendment does indeed apply to
administrative searches, but that warrants for such searches
need not be supported by probable cause in the traditional sense
since such searches "are neither personal in nature nor aimed at
the discovery of evidence of crime.' ' Q
Soon, however, the Court created an ostensibly narrow ex-
ception to this warrant requirement: where the particular indus-
try is subject to close governmental supervision and the author-
izing statute prescribes specific procedural rules governing the
conduct of the search, warrantless searches do not offend the
Constitution.57 Just three years after explaining that this excep-
tion was limited to those "relatively unique circumstances"
where a long history of governmental oversight precludes any
reasonable expectation of privacy,"' the Court substantially
broadened the exception, holding that it is the "pervasiveness
and regularity," not the longevity, of regulation that determines
See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
11 Id. at 366.
387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrant requirement of Fourth Amendment applies to busi-
ness as well as residential premises).
' 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (to the same effect as Camara).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 537 (emphasis added).
'7 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless in-
spection of alcoholic beverage industry constitutional because industry long subject to
close supervision and inspection); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (Colon-
nade extended to firearms industry).
Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrantles inspection of commer-
cial premises may offend Fourth Amendment if random, infrequent, or unpredictable).
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whether a warrant is necessary.59
It was in this context of shifting constitutional meaning that
a unanimous New York Court of Appeals held in People v. Bur-
.gers° that Vehicle and Traffic Law section 415-a(5)(a),6 ' the stat-
ute later challenged in Keta, violated the Fourth Amendment.
Section 415-a(5)(a) required vehicle-dismantling businesses to
maintain records of vehicles that came into their possession, au-
thorized Department of Motor Vehicles agents and police of-
ficers to examine those records, and permitted warrantless
searches to locate and inspect items subject to the record-keep-
ing requirement. Striking down section 415-a(5)(a) in Burger,
the court of appeals reasoned that the exception for administra-
tive searches was not applicable because the purported "admin-
istrative" scheme allowed searches "of vehicles and vehicle parts
notwithstanding the absence of any records against which the
results of such a search could be compared"; it thus "author-
ize[d] searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of crimi-
nality [i.e., the possession of stolen property] and not to enforce
a comprehensive regulatory scheme." 2
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed63 and the law of ad-
9 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605-06 (1981) (warrant not required for search
of commercial premises where Congress has reasonably determined search necessary to
further regulatory scheme and regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and
defined).
60 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986).
" New York's law provides, in part:
Every person required to be registered pursuant to this section shall maintain
a record of all motor vehicles, trailers, and major component parts thereof,
coming into his possession together with a record of the disposition of any such
motor vehicle, trailer or part thereof and shall maintain proof of ownership for
any motor vehicle, trailer or major component part thereof while in his posses-
sion. Such records shall be maintained in a manner and form prescribed by the
commissioner .... Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any
police officer and during his regular and usual business hours, a vehicle dis-
mantler shall produce such records and permit said agent or police officer to
examine them and any vehicles or parts of vehicles which are subject to the
record keeping requirements of this section and which are on the premises....
The failure to produce such records or to permit such inspection on the part of
any person required to be registered pursuant to this section as required by
this paragraph shall be a class A misdemeanor.
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 415-a(5)a (Mckinney 1986).
62 Burger, 67 N.Y.2d at 344-45, 493 N.E.2d at 929-30, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 705-06.
63 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). On remand, the court of appeals dis-
missed the appeal at the prosecutor's request when respondent Burger could not be
found. People v. Burger, 70 N.Y.2d 828, 518 N.E.2d 1, 523 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1987).
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ministrative searches took yet another hairpin bend. The Court
discounted the court of appeals's primary premise: that the ad-
ministrative search exception cannot be used to validate war-
rantless searches conducted for the purpose of exposing viola-
tions of penal law. The fact that section 415-a(5)(a)'s objectives
happened to coincide with those of the penal law was of no im-
portance, according to the Supreme Court, because a state may
"address a major social problem... [e.g., car theft] both by way
of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions."'"
The Court concluded that New York had a substantial interest
in regulating the vehicle dismantling industry as a means of con-
taining the stolen vehicle industry and that warrantless inspec-
tions were reasonably necessary to serve that interest.'"
Addressing the requirements that the industry be a closely
regulated one, the Court held that this test was satisfied because
the regulations were "extensive" and, although the vehicle dis-
mantling business was a fairly recent phenomenon, it was "re-
lated to" the junkyard and pawnshop businesses. According to
the Court, these businesses had been the subject of close super-
vision in the past." Finally, the Court concluded that the func-
tions that would otherwise be served by a warrant were satisfied
because the statute placed adequate limitations on the time,
place, and scope of the administrative inspection. 7
Five years later, in People v. Keta,18 the New York Court of
Appeals finally had an occasion to revisit the administrative-
search issue. Issuing a consolidated opinion for Scott and Keta,
the court's revisitation was fraught with anger and indignation.
Judge Titone wrote the majority opinion addressing Keta, in
which Judges Hancock, Kaye, and Alexander joined. Judges
Simons and Bellacosa and Chief Judge Wachtler issued an om-
nibus dissent to the Scott and Keta opinions.
B. The Facts of Keta
George Keta, the owner and operator of an automobile dis-
mantling business in Maspeth, Queens was charged with multi-
482 U.S. at 712 (emphasis added).
- Id. at 708.
" Id. at 706-07.
Id. at 711.
" 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
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ple counts of criminal possession of stolen vehicle parts. He
moved to suppress the physical evidence seized from his busi-
ness premises, arguing that section 415-a(5)(a) violated article I,
section 12 of New York's constitution. 9
A hearing was held, establishing that in February, 1988 five
police officers arrived at Keta's business premises, announced
that they were present to perform an administrative inspection,
and proceeded to search for parts of stolen vehicles. When their
search was rewarded, they checked Keta's "police book" and
found that it did not contain the mandated information about
the contraband vehicle parts."°
The hearing court agreed with Keta, holding that warrant-
less searches under section 415-a(5)(a) violate article I, section
12 of the state constitution. A divided appellate division re-
versed, declining to read article 1, section 12 differently from the
Supreme Court's most recent reading of the Fourth
Amendment.7
C. The Majority Opinion
As in Scott, the majority begins its analysis with a detailed
history of Fourth Amendment precedent in the Supreme
Court; 2 it characterizes that precedent as "perplexing. '" 7" Before
addressing the substantive issue-whether section 415-a(5)(a)
offends article I, section 12-the majority briefly reaffirms not
only its authority to reject the Court's Burger decision, but its
duty to do so if that decision does not meet state constitutional
standards.74 The Court notes that "[t]he Supreme Court itself
has on more than one occasion reminded us that we-as 'the pri-
mary guardian[s] of the liberty of the people'-have the power
to interpret the provisions of our State Constitution as providing
greater protections than their federal counterparts."70 Even
where identical language "generally tends to support a policy of
uniformity," the "worthwhile goal" of uniformity must yield
11 Id. at 492, 593 N.E.2d at 1339, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
70 Id.
71 People v. Keta, 165 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1991).
72 See supra part I.A.
71 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 494, 593 N.E.2d at 1340, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
71 Id. at 495, 593 N.E.2d at 1340-41, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
76 Id. at 496, 593 N.E.2d at 1341-42, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (quoting California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)).
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where "a sharp or sudden change in direction by the United
States Supreme Court dramatically narrows fundamental consti-
tutional rights that our citizens have long assumed to be a part
of their birthright. '76 With respect to the precise "analytical
methodology" of state constitutionalism, the majority "simply
adopt[s] the views expressed in the concurrence.""
Turning to the question presented, the majority holds that
"[o]ur firm and continuing commitment to protecting the pri-
vacy rights embodied within article I, § 12, of our State Consti-
tution leads us to the conclusion that Vehicle and Traffic Law
§ 415-a(5)(a)'s provisions for warrantless, suspicionless searches
of business premises cannot withstand challenge under our State
Constitution." 8 Underlying most of the majority's quarrel with
Burger is its conviction that, potentially at least, administrative
searches are the "twentieth century equivalent" of the infamous
colonial Writs of Assistance.7 9 The Writs, which authorized offi-
cials to search any premises without particularized suspicion,
were "an important component of colonial resentment against
the Crown and, in fact, 'ignited the flame that led to American
independence'."'80 In light of this ominous similarity, the court of
appeals concludes that rules governing administrative searches
"must be narrowly and precisely tailored to prevent the subver-
sion of the basic privacy values embodied in our Constitution." 81
Specifically, the majority identifies four weaknesses in the "prin-
ciples and standards" of Burger that put these values at risk.82
First, Burger permits administrative searches where they
are "undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality" and
where the underlying regulatory scheme is "in reality, designed
simply to give the police an expedient means of enforcing penal
sanctions."' According to the Keta majority, it was a "funda-
' Scott, at 496-97, 593 N.E.2d at 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
Id. at 496, 593 N.E.2d at 1341, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 933 ("including [the concur-
rence's] well founded point concerning the tone of the dissent").
78 Id. at 497, 593 N.E.2d at 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
Id. at 497, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 364 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
"Scott, at 498, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (quoting Comment, The
Junking of the Fourth Amendment: Illinois v. KruUl and New York v. Burger, 63 TUL L.
Rv. 335, 335-36 (1988)).
81 Id. at 498, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
82 Id.
83Id.
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mental assumption" in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence before
Burger that the administrative search exception could not be in-
voked in such circumstances." This assumption was "analyti-
cally sound" because permitting "administrative" searches for
evidence of criminality would permit the originally narrow ex-
ception to the warrant and probable cause requirements to
"swallow up the rule."85
Second, Burger's analysis of the "essential element of perva-
sive governmental supervision" is insufficiently rigorous and in-
consistent with the court of appeals's conception of a "narrow
and carefully circumscribed" administrative search exception.80
The Supreme Court found the "pervasive supervision" require-
ment to be satisfied by analogy: automobile dismantling busi-
nesses are "related to" junkyards and, according to the Court,
junkyards are highly regulated.8 7 Rejecting the Court's reason-
ing, the court of appeals examines the actual vehicle-dismantling
regulatory scheme and concludes that "such minimal regulatory
requirements as the obligations to register with the government,
to pay a fee and to maintain certain prescribed books and
records" do not constitute "close regulation" or a "pervasive"
regulatory scheme. 8 Indeed, the Keta majority warns, "[i]f the
existence of such relatively nonintrusive obligations were suffi-
cient, few businesses would escape being labelled 'closely regu-
lated,' and warrantless, suspicionless general inspections would
become the rule rather than the exception."8
Third, the Supreme Court mistakenly concludes in Burger
that section 415-a(5)(a) contains rules that guarantee the "cer-
tainty and regularity of ... application" necessary to provide a
"constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."90 The only
8 Id. (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 n.6 (1981); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)); People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986); In re Glenwood TV, Inc. v. Ratner, 103 A.D.2d 322, 330 n.6, 480
N.Y.S.2d 98, 103-04 (1984), afl'd, 65 N.Y.2d 642, 491 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1985), appeal dis-
missed, 474 U.S. 916 (1985) (administrative search upheld where inspectors do not seek
evidence of a crime and their function is limited to insuring compliance with a civil regu-
latory scheme); see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
11 Keta, 79 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
88 Id. at 499, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 499, 593 N.E.2d at 1344, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
88 Id.
80 Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)).
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unequivocal restriction in the statute is the requirement that
searches take place during business hours. It neither furnishes
guidelines for determining which establishments may be
targeted nor sets a maximum number of times that a particular
establishment may be searched within a given time period.
Moreover, "because the regulatory scheme prescribes no stan-
dards or required practices other than the maintenance of a 'po-
lice book,' there are no real administrative violations that could
be uncovered in a search, and, concomitantly, there is nothing
inherent in the statutory scheme to limit the scope of the
searches it authorizes."91 Thus, entailing a virtually unmitigated
risk of arbitrary and abusive enforcement, section 415-a(5)(a)
"shares one of the most objectionable characteristics of colonial
writs of assistance." 92
Finally, the Keta majority finds that Burger inappropriately
emphasizes the "substantial" governmental interest in regulat-
ing the vehicle dismantling industry-deterring and prosecuting
car-theft-and the "necessity" of warrantless searches to the
furtherance of this interest.93 By its very nature, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 12 is a "counterbalanc-
ing check on what may be done to individual citizens in the
name of governmental goals. 94 Warrantless searches are always
useful in detecting and deterring crime, an activity in which the
government always has at least a "substantial" interest. "If
these were the only criteria for determining when citizens' pri-
vacy rights may be curtailed, there would.., be few, if any situ-
ations in which the protections of article I, section 12, would
operate.19 5
The majority thus takes indignant issue with Judge Bel-
lacosa's dissent that the prevalence of automobile theft in New
York and the concomitant "intolerable" economic loss justify
Burger and the search provisions of section 415-a(5)(a):90
9' Id. at 499-500, 593 N.E.2d at 1344, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 500, 593 N.E.2d at 1344, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
9I Id.
94 Id.
9Id.
Id. at 517, 593 N.E.2d at 1355, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). The
majority characterizes this argument as "the dissent's appeal to our citizens' legitimate
fears about rising crime." Id. at 501, 593 N.E.2d at 1345, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
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The alarming increase of unlicensed weapons on our urban streets and
the catastrophic rise in the use of crack cocaine and heroin are also
matters of pressing concern, but few would seriously argue that those
unfortunate facets of modern life justify routine searches of pedestri-
ans on the street.... The fact is that, regrettably, there will always be
crime in our society, and there will always be upsurges in the rate of
particular crimes.... Indeed, the writs of assistance were themselves
a response of the colonial government to an unprecedented wave of
criminal smuggling-a crime that also led to "intolerable" economic
losses.
Our responsibility in the judicial branch is not to respond to
these temporary crises or to shape the law so as to advance the goals
of law enforcement, but rather to stand as a fixed citadel for constitu-
tional rights, safeguarding them against those who would dismantle
our system of ordered liberty in favor of a system of well-kept order
alone.... [A]s Benjamin Franklin [observed] some two hundred years
ago... "those who give up essential liberty to purchase a little tempo-
rary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
97
Finding section 415-a(5)(a) unconstitutional, the majority
nonetheless concludes that a statute providing for administra-
tive inspections of vehicle dismantling businesses could be con-
stitutionally drawn. The inspection provisions of such a statute
would have to be part of a comprehensive administrative pro-
gram unrelated to the enforcement of the criminal law, however.
Further, inspections "must be pursuant to an administrative
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, although they need not
be based on probable cause in the traditional sense ... or, alter-
natively, the law must provide for such certainty and regularity
of application as to be a constitutionally adequate substitute for
a warrant."98
III. SCOTT AND KETA: OMNIBUS DISSENT AND CONCURRENCE
A. The Dissent
As the Scott majority observes, Judge Bellacosa's lengthy
omnibus dissent does not overtly "take issue with the basic pro-
position that in a free society the police should not be permitted
to encroach upon private property against the owner's will and
then to use the fruits of their trespass as incriminating evi-
97 Id. at 500-01, 593 N.E.2d at 1344-45, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37.
98 Id. at 502, 593 N.E.2d at 1345, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
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dence."9 9 Rather, the dissent's considerable rage is focused on
the criteria the majority uses (or fails to use) in determining to
reject Supreme Court precedent.100 According to the dissent, the
court totally disregards its own precedent, which the dissent
maintains would have required the application of a rigid, multi-
phase test before departing from a Supreme Court decision.20'
Judge Bellacosa accuses the majority of basing its decisions on
"mere ideological disagreement ... with the definitive decisions
of the highest court in the land.'1
0 2
The dissent's central criticism is that the majority ignored
precedent by failing to apply "non-interpretive" analysis in de-
termining whether "sufficient reasons" existed for disagreeing
with the Supreme Court. 0 3 According to the dissent, non-inter-
pretive analysis finds sufficient reasons only in
preexisting State statutory or common-law defining the scope of the
individual right in question; the history and traditions of the State in
its protection of the individual right; any identification of the right in
the State Constitution as being one of peculiar State or local concern;
and any distinctive attitudes of the State citizenry toward the defini-
tion, scope, or protection of the individual right.'0'
9 Id. at 489, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
10 The tone of the dissent is set as the first paragraph cuts a path that propels it
furiously across several metaphors:
In these cases, the Court cuts its own constitutional path through a commercial
marijuana farm nestled in 165 acres of idyllic "open fields" in Chenango
County, New York State, to the open yard of an alleged "chop shop," an urban
auto dismantling business, in Maspeth, Queens County, New York City. The
Court's declaration of independence from the Supreme Law of the Land and
from this Court's own recent noninterpretive constitutional analysis and defini-
tive guidance propels the Court across a jurisprudential Rubicon into a kind of
Articles of Confederation time warp. The "movement" has been dubbed the
"New Federalism."
Id. at 506, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
101 Id. at 510, 593 N.E.2d at 1351, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 510, 593 N.E.2d at 1350-51, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942.43 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
103 Curiously, the term "non-interpretive" is not explained in Scott or Keta. How-
ever, it is explained in People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556,503 N.Y.S.2d
907 (1987). According to that decision, when confronted with a provision of the state
Constitution that is worded differently from its federal counterpart, the court of appeals
will interpret the language of the provisions. When state and federal provisions are iden-
tically worded, however, the state court will not interpret the language, but rather, will
"proceed from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice, and fundamental fairness."
P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
14 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 510, 593 N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (Bellacosa, J.,
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Two further rationales cited by the dissent are the need for fed-
eral-state uniformity and the need for a "bright-line" test.05 As
measured by the dissent against these criteria, the majority's de-
cisions fail to supply a sufficient number of reasons, and, in so
far as they supply reasons, they fail to be satisfactory.
The dissent criticizes the Scott majority for basing its con-
clusion that Oliver disturbs settled New York law on its own
perception that Oliver simply changes federal law. According to
the dissent, state law can only be "unsettled" by a federal ruling
that directly conflicts with it.l08 Judge Bellacosa also accuses the
majority of conflating the Katz search-and-seizure privacy inter-
est with generalized privacy concerns in which, he agrees, New
York takes special interest.10 7 Moreover, the dissent taxes the
majority for "disdain[ing] uniformity in constitutional adjudica-
tion," according to Judge Bellacosa a vital concern in drug pros-
ecutions, where state and federal agencies sometimes collabo-
rate; had the informant in Scott "called the F.B.I. instead of the
local sheriff ... the major criminal drug harvester would not be
set free to resume the illicit drug enterprise,"'08
All of the criticisms detailed above in respect to Scott were
equally directed at Keta. Thus, like the Scott majority, the Keta
majority is accused by the dissenters of "sever[ing] the expecta-
tion of privacy attribute from its essential unreasonable searches
and seizures mooring, and invest[ing] [the case] in the alluring
cloak of a generalized privacy interest, as a matter of unique
New York concern." 109 Further, the dissent rejects the majority's
conclusion that Burger conflicts with preexisting state law. Fi-
nally, in the dissent's view Scott compromised the state-federal
ideal of uniformity, so Keta fails the "bright line" test: like
Scott, it will "sow confusion in understanding the law and divi-
dissenting).
105 Id.
100 Id.
1 7 Id. at 510, 593 N.E.2d at 1350-51, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
108 Id. at 515, 593 N.E.2d at 1354, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 507, 593 N.E.2d at 1349, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 941 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
The Keta majority complains "nowhere does the dissent explain how the state constitu-
tional privacy right we recognize here differs from 'the traditional expectation of privacy
feature of the unreasonable searches and seizures protection [previously recognized] in
criminal jurisprudence.'" Id. at 496 n.3, 593 N.E.2d at 1341 n.3, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 933 n.3
(quoting id. at 513, 593 N.E.2d at 1353, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)).
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sion in the execution of responsible administrative, investigative
and prosecutorial responsibilities. 10 According to the dissent,
"if state fiscal and personnel resources had allowed Department
of Motor Vehicle administrative agents to conduct the initial
random inspection, and had they then notified criminal law en-
forcement authorities of the theft findings, perhaps there would
be a different result in [Keta]."111 As it stands, the dissent fears
that Keta, like Scott, will visit "calamitous consequences in eco-
nomics and crimes" on New York.112
The penultimate section of the dissent is addressed to Keta
alone. There the dissent describes at length the "horrendous
proportions" of New York's auto theft rate and its "intolerable
economic burden on the citizens of New York."113 It was despite
these statistics and the legislature's determination that regula-
tion and inspection are necessary that the majority granted pri-
vacy protection to auto dismantlers-for the dissenters, an en-
tirely gratuitous act.
The Court today points to no history or tradition of this State creat-
ing a peculiar State or local concern warranting extra New York pri-
vacy protections to such commercial operations, or that vehicle dis-
mantlers in New York have historically expected or been accorded
greater protection than that afforded by the United States Supreme
Court in New York v. Burger to the rest of the nation. In fact, the
opposite is true .... The pervasiveness of the auto theft crisis, the
legislative history, the carefully prescribed nature and specifics of the
administrative regime adopted, and the history of close governmental
oversight of this and related crime-plagued industries support the em-
inently reasonable conclusion that the operators of these commercial
establishments possess a greatly reduced expectation of privacy, espe-
cially during business hours.114
Finally, Judge Bellacosa warns that "inasmuch as this
110 Id. at 515, 593 N.E.2d at 1354, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (Bellaceosa, J. dissenting).
11 Id. The majority characterizes this as a "non.existent stravnan" distinction.
"Regardless of whether the inspection is undertaken by a police officer or an administra-
tive officer, the State Constitution is offended if the standards ... described [in the
majority opinion] are unsatisfied." Id. at 502 n.6, 593 N.E.2d at 1345 n.6, 583 N.Y.S.2d at
937 n.6 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Id. at 515, 593 N.E.2d at 1354, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (Bellaco-a, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 517, 593 N.E.2d at 1355, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (Bellacmma, J., dissenting).
Id. at 517, 593 N.E.2d at 1355, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). Dissenters Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Simons have apparently
changed their views in the six years between People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493
N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986), and Keta.
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court's self-imposed non-interpretive analysis has now been ef-
fectively scuttled by [Scott and Keta], New York's adjudicative
process is left bereft of any external or internal doctrinal
disciplines."' 1 5
B. The Concurrence
Judge Kaye concurs "only to respond to the broader state-
ments and implications of the dissent about state constitutional
law, and especially about us."" 6 Although state constitutional
law cases tend to "fracture" the court more consistently than
any other category of case, there is, according to the concur-
rence, a common thread running through those cases: "at least
four judges (not always the same four) ... have perceived some-
thing distinctive about New York, or about the particular case,
that called upon the Court to differ from the United States Su-
preme Court.""" The dissenters always argued that there was in
fact no "unique New York interest.""" Scott is thus no different
from earlier state constitutional law cases, Judge Kaye argues,
except for the "tone" of Judge Bellacosa's dissent and his "base-
less ... accusation that the Court's legal conclusions and analy-
sis are the product of ideology.""'
The concurrence argues that the majority opinion does in-
deed follow precedent, and that "in an evolving field of constitu-
tional rights," the court is not required to rigidly apply an "iron-
clad checklist" on pain of being accused of "lack of principle or
lack of adherence to stare decisis.' 20 When it concludes that
"the Supreme Court has changed course and diluted constitu-
"I Scott, at 518, 593 N.E.2d at 1356, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 948 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
According to the dissenters, this "long-term guidance vacuum," id. at 512, 593 N.E.2d at
1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944, is created in part by the majority/concurrence's misuse of
precedent: "[People v.] Johnson [66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618
(1985)] certainly does not stand for anything like the role the three Opinions of the
Court have variously assigned to it, and P.J. Video and Harris did not open up the
analytical process and choices to the extremes illustrated by [Scott and Keta]. Nor is the
new approach supported by the litany of New York cases relied upon by the court, espe-
cially in Scott." Id. at 512, 593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (Bellacosa, J,,
dissenting).
"I Id. at 503, 593 N.E.2d at 1346, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (Kaye, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 512, 593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 503, 593 N.E.2d at 1346, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (Kaye, J., concurring).
0 Id. at 504, 593 N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (Kaye, J., concurring).
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tional principles," the court of appeals must decide whether to
"follow along." '121
Further, according to the concurrence, the dissent wrongly
sees "impropriety" in the court's rejection of a Supreme Court
decision. 22 On the contrary, the concurrence argues, rejecting
Supreme Court precedent and opting for greater safeguards is a
respectable, even respectful action. "Time and again ... the Su-
preme Court as well as its individual Justices have reminded
state courts not merely of this right but also of their responsibil-
ity to interpret their own Constitutions, and [to reject the views
of the Supreme Court] where in the state courts' view those pro-
visions afford greater safeguards .... ,123 Thus, as Justice White
recently wrote, "[i]ndividual states may surely construe their
own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on po-
lice conduct than does the Federal Constitution. 24 Ultimately,
the states "remain the primary guardian of the liberty of the
people."125
Finally, a state court does not "disdain" the Supreme Court
by choosing to grant more protection. By imposing different,
stricter rules, the states serve as "laboratories for nationallaw."M26
IV. SCOTT AND KETA (AND OLIVER AND BURGER) AS SEARCH-AND-
SEIZURE LAW
Analyzing Scott and Keta as search-and-seizure law neces-
sarily presupposes close analysis of Oliver and Burger as well
because, for good or for ill, the court of appeals framed the de-
bate negatively (Is the Supreme Court wrong?).
Since one important measure of a judicial opinion is how
well it reads when we read it well, the four cases are analyzed
from what is essentially a law-and-literature perspective. Close
textual scrutiny; fundamentally literary, can reveal vastly more
than felicity or infelicity of organization and expression. Close
121 Id.
122 Id.
1 Id. at 505, 593 N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (Kaye, J., concurring).
32, Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)).
125 Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 739 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
12 Id. at 505-06, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Kaye, J., concurring).
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and critical reading of a judicial opinion can disclose candor, me-
ticulous reasoning, a generous and democratic imagination; it
can also expose incoherence, intellectual force majeure, and cov-
ert manipulation of the reader's emotions. It can thus tell us a
great deal about the "rightness" or "wrongness" of a decision.121
To put Scott, Keta, Oliver, and Burger to the question, this Ar-
ticle borrows a mode of analysis devised by law-and-literature
dean James Boyd White and applied by him to Olmstead v.
United States,12 8 an essential early decision in the development
of search-and-seizure law. Measured by White's "standards of
excellence,"' 29 Scott and Keta are very good decisions indeed, as
cogent in their reasoning as they are passionate about individual
rights and democratic values. The same scrutiny reveals Oliver
and Burger to be as incoherent in their reasoning as they are
overbearing in their tone, superficially seductive invitations to
an authoritarian monologue.130 Thus, whatever the nature of
Scott and Keta's contribution to the discourse of state constitu-
tionalism, they are abundantly correct in their rejection of Oli-
ver and Burger in terms of search and seizure law.
127 Although, like so much of contemporary scholarship, such textual criticism is an
inheritor of legal realism, it uses its own revealing filters, including the analysis of genre,
voice, diction, and rhetoric. It sees the judicial opinion and indeed, the law itself, as
"interpretive and compositional, and in this sense, a radically literary activity." White,
supra note 8, at 836. This literary exegesis of judicial opinions is one aspect of the "law-
as-literature" movement, itself a part of the larger "law-and-literature" enterprise. See
generally Richard Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L, & HUMAN, 1
(1988). Some of the most notable practitioners of the genre are White himself, Richard
Weisberg, and Robert A. Ferguson. See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion
as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990); Richard Weisberg, How Judges
Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor With an Application to
Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1982); White, supra note 8. Although Patricia
Williams's focus is not so overtly literary, she is also an unsparingly intelligent reader of
judicial opinions. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on
Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
128 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
129 White, supra note 8, at 869; see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
130 Of course, as White says of his Olmstead analysis, we always "make" some of the
meaning we "claim" for a text. This is inevitable, yet ultimately salutary, because
[t]he reader of this paper will in turn give it much of whatever meaning he
claims for it. The text at once creates and constrains a liberty (or a power) in
its reader, and in doing so defines for the reader a particular kind of responsi-
bility. It is in that combination-liberty, constraint, and responsibility, for the
reader and maker of texts-that the ethical and intellectual heart of the law
can be found.
White, supra note 8, at 870.
[Vol. 58: 1279
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
A. White's Reading of Olmstead
Asked what a long life had taught him, John Dewey replied,
"I have learned that democracy begins in conversation."113 ' This
answer informs Professor White's analysis of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Olmstead v. United States.3 2 "Locating"
Dewey's insight in the context of the law, White sees the law in
general and the Olmstead opinions of Justices Taft and Bran-
deis in particular, as "way[s] of reading, composing, and criticiz-
ing authoritative texts, and in so doing, as a way of constituting,
through conversation, a community and a culture of a certain
kind." 33 More specifically, he suggests that
[i]n every opinion a court not only resolves a particular dispute one
way or another, but validates or authorizes one kind of response to
argument, one way of looking at the world and its own authority...
[E]ach case is an invitation to lawyers and judges to talk one way
rather than another, to give one kind of meaning rather than another
to what they do, and this invitation can itself be analyzed and judged.
Is this an invitation to a conversation in which democracy begins (or
1 White, supra note 8, at 835.
.32 277 U.S. 438 (1927). Olmstead concerned the government's warrantless tapping
of telephones belonging to suspected bootleggers. Convicted on the evidence thus ob-
tained, the defendants appealed, arguing that the Fourth Amendment forbade warrant-
less wiretapping. Chief Justice Taft crisply dismissed their argument-
The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the
person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description of the varrant
necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is that it must specify the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
... The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants.
277 U.S. at 464.
Justice Brandeis's dissent contains the following famous and influential pazs3age:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, a right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Perhaps the least significant fact about Olin-
stead is that it was overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see supra note 18 and accom-
panying text.
3 White, supra note 8, at 836.
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flourishes)? Or to one in which it ends?134
Reading Olmstead's two primary opinions, 13 White asks of
each:
How does it define the Constitution it is interpreting; the process of
constitutional interpretation in which it is engaged; the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment; the place and character of the individual citi-
zen in our country, and that of the judge, the law, and the lawyer?
What conversation does it establish, with what relation to "democ-
racy"? What community does it call into being, constituted by what
practices and enacting what values?138
Read in this light, Justice Taft's majority opinion reveals
itself to White as purely conclusory upon a complex issue,13 7
conclusory in its treatment of precedent, 13  and reliant for au-
thority on the very voice of authority that it creates for itself.1 3 9
Moreover, in Justice Taft's characterization, the Constitution is
no more than a document that tells the rest of us what to do, the
"ultimate boss," a document that has "no higher purposes, no
discernible values, no aims or context."' 0 The judge is the "in-
termediate boss" in the community that Justice Taft's opinion
evokes.14 1 The judge's role is to tell the rest of us what it is the
,14 Id. at 846.
"' 277 U.S. 438 (1927); 277 U.S. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
W6 hite, supra note 8, at 847.
137 White argues that Justice Taft's laconic conclusion-"There was no searching.
There was no seizure."-is debatable even in Taft's view of the law. Id. at 850. The
government clearly trespassed against the telephone company, and the defendant might
well have had standing to protest. Or the defendant might have been said to have a
leasehold or easement in the telephone wires. Moreover, if words can be property under
copyright law, why can they not be said to be seized? Id. at 851-52.
' For instance, Justice Taft says of Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921),
only that it "carried the inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to the
extreme limit." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463.
"' [Taft] repeatedly characterizes both the facts and the other judicial opin-
ions with a kind of blunt and unquestioning finality, as if everything were obvi-
ously and unarguably as he sees them, and in doing this he prepares us for the
conclusory and unreasoned characterizations upon which the case ultimately
turns. He makes a character for himself in his writing and then relies upon
that created self as the ground upon which his opinion rests .... There is a
kind of self-evident circularity about this, of course, but here as elsewhere ar-
guments from self-evidence have a remarkable power, at least for those dis-
posed to share the basic premises.
White, supra note 8, at 852-53.
14 Id. at 853.
" Indeed, the voice Justice Taft fashions for himself reminds White of "a crusty
old boss from a 1930s movie." Id. at 855. It is the created voices, the literary personae, of
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Constitution requires us to do-not to reason or explain, not to
"creat[e] in the reader the power that reason and explanation
do," but rather, to perpetrate "an act of power resting on
power. ' 142 In contrast to this terse and simplistic concept of the
Constitution, Justice Taft describes at great length and in great
detail Olmstead's flourishing criminal enterprise and the at-
tempts of law enforcement agencies to bring that awesome boot-
legging behemoth to its knees. 1
43
[T]his narrative implicitly supports the constitutional ideology [Jus-
tice Taft] has been obeying, for it invites us to see power and force as
real, language as simple, and government as about the struggle be-
tween the forces of good and the forces of evil .... And law is simply
the will of good authority."'
Justice Taft's majority opinion works as well as it does, ac-
cording to White, because it appeals to our (ultimately suicidal)
desire to be passive, to be told in no uncertain terms what is
what. Although it is our individual responsibility to "engage as
an autonomous and present person '"14 with our culture's sacred
constitutive texts, we tend to yield to claimed authority. "When
we do so, we participate in a conversation that is not the begin-
ning, but the end of democracy. '"1 4
In contrast, White finds that Justice Brandeis's voice and
his notions of authority, constitution, interpretation, and com-
munity are consistent with democracy. His voice is that of "a
teacher, a teacher who must first learn, and who by having
learned may teach. ' 147 This self-definition in turn defines the
law, legal education, and the Constitution "as challenging [our]
Justices Taft and Brandeis in their Olmstead opinions that concern White here-not, to
be sure, the historical personages.
" Id. at 853. According to White, Justice Taft assures us, "The Constitution is a
document written in plain English making plain commands: If you think they are not
plain, wait till I have spoken and I will make them plain." Id.
"I Id. at 854. "At the end of this long statement of the facts, Taft abruptly inter-
poses the language of the fourth amendment, flopped before us like a pancah-e." Id.
White concludes, "what [Taft] admires [is] organization, scale, enterprise, and success. It
would be possible to imagine someone saying: 'The Constitution of the United States is
an achievement of amazing magnitude.' But Taft's enthusiasms, as expressed in this text
at least, lie elsewhere." Id.
144 Id.
14 Id. at 857.
148 Id.
147 Id. at 865.
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every intellectual and moral capacity."14 In contrast to Justice
Taft's conclusory pronouncement of no-search-no-seizure, Jus-
tice Brandeis asks how the text should be "expounded. '149 He
goes on to demonstrate how in the past the Court had repeat-
edly read the Constitution in "non-literalist" fashion, sustaining
Congress's exercise of power over "objects of which the Fathers
could not have dreamed."'150
Justice Brandeis's view of the Constitution and its "ex-
pounding" implies a view of human life and society at odds with
that of Justice Taft. The dissenter sees humanity living in time
and through change, shaped by immediate experience yet seek-
ing through our collective life to "maintain a central identity
while undergoing this process of change and to learn from that
process. 1 51 In such a view, interpretation of the Constitution is
"translation," bringing a text from the past into the present. In-
deed, in his dissent, Justice Brandeis not only translates the
Constitution into contemporary legal language, he translates it
into contemporary ordinary language, into the vulgate, when he
invokes the "right to be let alone.' '1 52 He thus invites a conversa-
tion "not only among lawyers, but among citizens, a conversa-
tion in that sense democratic.' ' 53 But the conversation is demo-
cratic in a larger sense also: "in its ultimate subjection to
popular determination, in its openness to all who learn its
terms. . .but most of all in its recognition that the essential con-
ditions of human life that it takes as its premises are shared by
all of us.' ' 54
White concludes that a judge's definition of the judicial role
and "of us and the conversation that constitutes us"'5 5 is more
than a formal or technical matter: there is ultimately no distinc-
tion between form and content, opinion and result. "You cannot
write a great novel in support of anti-semitism, wrote Sartre,
148 Id.
249 Id. at 858.
290 Id. at 850 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
,6' Id. at 860. Thus, White describes Justice Brandeis's view: "The point of the Con-
stitution is to enable us to bring into our minds at once both our own experience and
that of our predecessors, and to think about that experience as a whole in a disciplined
way: it is in principle a mode of education and self-creation over time." Id.
"I Id. at 864.
163 Id.
14 Id. at 867-68.
'"9 Id. at 869.
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and I think you cannot write a great opinion that denies that
sense of the ultimate value of the individual person that is nec-
essarily enacted in any sincerely other-recognizing
expression."' 156
B. Oliver
Over half a century after Olmstead, the voice of Justice
Taft's "crusty old boss"'157 can still be heard in Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court in Oliver.58 Like Justice Taft in Olin-
stead, Justice Powell makes short work of the defendants' claim.
Despite the significance of the Fourth Amendment issue posed,
he takes surprisingly few pages to dispose of it on two separate
grounds. 159 Indeed, Justice Powell's discussion of the first
ground occupies only two paragraphs:
The rule announced in Hester v. United States was founded
upon the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment. That Amend-
ment indicates with some precision the places and things encom-
passed by its protections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court
in his characteristically laconic style: "[Tihe special protection af-
forded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The
distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common
law."
We conclude, as did the Court in deciding Hester v. United
States, that the government's intrusion upon the open fields is not
one of those "unreasonable searches" proscribed by the text of the
Fourth Amendment. 60
This brief passage tells us more about Justice Powell's no-
tions of Court, Constitution, and community than it does about
the substantive issue. Like Justice Taft in Olmstead, what Jus-
tice Powell values is authority; Justice Holmes's voice itself vali-
dates Hester. What Justice Powell commends to the reader is
15C Id.
157 Id. at 855.
XIS 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Just as White is concerned with the created voices that
speak in Olmstead, this Article analyzes the various voices, the personae, that announce
Oliver, Scott, Burger, and Keta-not the judicial philosophies or real-life personalities of
Justices Powell and Blackmun and Judges Hancock and Titone.
"' The Court's analysis occupies ten pages in United States Reports and four and
one-half pages in the Supreme Court Reporter.
160 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176, 177.
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not Justice Holmes's reasoning, but his "characteristically la-
conic style.' 161 In fact, one might argue that the last thing a
good judicial opinion should be is so laconic as to be full of
holes, but no matter, Justice Holmes's persona transforms this
vice into a virtue, or at worst, a mere stylistic quirk. 16 2 Indeed,
Justice Holmes's (and Justice Powell's) "explanation" is not rea-
soning, but a leap from assertion to assertion: the Fourth
Amendment does not protect open fields. "The distinction be-
tween [open fields] and the house is as old as the common
law.' 63 Thus echoing Justice Holmes, Justice Powell also echoes
Justice Taft's "no-searching-no-seizure" conclusory pronounce-
ment. Moreover, in its return to purported literalism,6 4 the ma-
jority opinion in Oliver embodies an Olmstead conception of the
Fourth Amendment not as embodied values, but as a simple
"textual" proscription of some kinds of searches. In the Oliver-
Olmstead world, the Constitution and Olympian judges tell us
the law with "precision." And the law is identical to what the
law was and will always be. No attempts are made to persuade
or educate the reader, who is not encouraged to ask questions. 6 '
The Oliver majority's other ground of decision-that under
Katz there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in fenced or
posted land is elaborated at much greater length, and is in this
sense superficially more plausible. Justice Powell's analysis be-
gins, however, with the bare assertion that the Court's first
ground of decision (open fields are not a house) is "consistent"
with the Katz understanding of the right to privacy inherent in
the Fourth Amendment that the Constitution protects people,
not places. 66 That no attempt is made to explain this assertion
161 Id. at 176.
162 When judges talk about "style," form and substance are inextricably intertwined.
163 466 U.S. at 176.
I" White explains thus the fallacy of literalism:
Since there is no such thing as "literal" reading of words, [Justice Taft's] repu-
diation of ambiguity and complexity itself works as an unexposed, unex-
plained, and unjustified claim to authority, including the authority to reduce
difficulty to simplicity - a claim to an authority that is in fact implicit in every
claim to read language "literally."
White, supra note 8, at 855.
"l' One might ask just how old the common law is and why that matters, or why no
authority other than the "laconic" Hester is cited. If indeed the framers intended a clear
distinction between a house and the land it stands on, surely this should be explained to
the readers and authority adduced.
"I Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
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is all the more disturbing because Katz is apparently inconsis-
tent with a "literal" reading of the Fourth Amendment. If the
Fourth Amendment protects only what it enumerates, how can
the telephonic communication from a telephone booth in Katz
be protected? How can the whole line of post-Katz holdings in-
validating searches of commercial establishments '67 be justi-
fied?""8 And, how can Hester be said to be good law when Olin-
stead, which built on Hester's "literalism," was overruled by
Katz? Finally, the unsupported assertion that Katz and Hester
are consistent is itself plainly inconsistent with the notion that
the law exists in time and through time. 6 '
Oliver's Katz analysis is more developed than its first
ground of decision, but ultimately no more coherent or candid.
The Court's conclusion that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in fenced and posted land rests on four contentions:
that there is no societal interest in protecting activities "such as
the cultivation of crops" that take place in open fields; 70 that
posting and fencing are not generally effective against trespass-
ers;17' that government agents can lawfully "search" land by fly-
ing over it; 172 and that in any event it is not "legitimate" to ex-
pect that unlawful activities like growing marijuana will remain
private . 73 Although these arguments have an initial common-
sense appeal, they turn out to rest, variously, on semantic sleight
of hand and rhetorical "bait and switch."
The term "open fields," used to refer to all privately-owned
undeveloped land, is itself highly equivocal. With its agrarian,
Jeffersonian ring, its evocation of an idyllic American past,
"open fields" is an effective image. Yet neither Oliver 74 nor its
11 See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
I" Justice Marshall objects to the Court's assertion of consistency. Oliver, 466 U.S.
at 185-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Yet it is conceivable that the majority could have
given an explanation. It might, for instance, have explained that Katz and progeny all
address situations which the framers could not have foreseen and that the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" analysis is limited to that context. The Court could then have
ended its opinion without such tortured reading of Katz.
1'9 466 U.S. at 194 n.18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 179.
271 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 182.
174 In Oliver marijuana was found growing in a "highly secluded" field a mile from
the entry to Oliver's property and "bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and embank-
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companion case, Maine v. Thornton,17  concerns anything that
could properly be called either a field or open. If indeed all
"open fields" were open to view, no "open fields" exception
would be necessary: the long-established "plain view" doctrine
would apply. 76 The term "open fields" thus distracts from the
real issue: whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in undeveloped real property that is both secluded and fenced.
It is only in a footnote at the end of his Katz analysis that Jus-
tice Powell belatedly defines "open fields" to "include any unoc-
cupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.'7
Further, the inaccurate and archaic term "open fields" is
also the basis of the Court's argument that only such non-inti-
mate activities as "the cultivation of crops" takes place there.
Yet, as Justice Marshall points out, secluded undeveloped land
is susceptible of a vast number of other ordinary, less imper-
sonal uses.' 78
The argument that the occasional ineffectiveness of fencing
and posting renders the expectation of privacy unreasonable is
also conclusory and dubious. Justice Powell tells us that "[ult is
not generally true that fences or 'No Trespassing' signs effec-
tively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas."170
This assertion of fact is simply thrust at the reader without any
hint as to how the writer knows this. It also misleadingly sug-
gests again that what is at issue here is mere viewing of open
areas-not, as is in fact the case, sustained trespass into a se-
ments," not visible "from any point of public access." Id. at 173-74. In Thornton the
respondent was growing marijuana in the woods. Id. at 174.
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
176 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) ("It is well estab-
lished that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view with.
out a warrant.").
' Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11.
18 Privately owned woods and fields that are not exposed to public view regu-
larly are employed in a variety of ways that society acknowledges deserve pri-
vacy. Many landowners like to take solitary walks on their property, confident
that they will not be confronted in their rambles by strangers or policemen,
Others conduct agricultural businesses on their property. Some landowners use
their secluded spaces to meet lovers, others to gather together with fellow wor-
shippers, still others to engage in sustained creative endeavor. Private land is
sometimes used as a refuge for wildlife, where flora and fauna are protected
from human intervention of any kind.
Id. at 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(footnotes omitted).
'79 Id. at 179.
[Vol. 58:1279
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
cluded area. Further, Justice Powell's reasoning is more sinister
than it might appear; it equally supports the conclusion that
people who live in a neighborhood plagued by robberies and bur-
glaries therefore lose the reasonable expectation that their per-
sons and homes will be exempt from government search and
seizure.
The ancillary argument that posted woods may be searched
on foot because they can be legitimately subjected to aerial
searches is also unsatisfactory. The fact that one limited form of
search is constitutionally permissible hardly authorizes all other
forms. For instance, a search incident to arrest does not author-
ize a general search of the defendant's home. 80 Justice Powell
writes in a footnote that if warrantless searches of posted land
are prohibited, this "merely would require law enforcement of-
ficers, in most situations, to use aerial surveillance.""8 First, this
argument assumes, erroneously, that what can be found on foot
can be seen from the air. Moreover, it is also ominously reminis-
cent of Justice Taft's Olmstead opinion in its suggestion that
the government's convenience is a dispositive Fourth Amend-
ment concern.
1 8 2
The argument that the legitimacy of an expectation of pri-
vacy can be measured by the nature of the landowner's activities
is the most disturbing of all Justice Powell's arguments. In the
last section of his analysis, he writes: "[W]e reject the suggestion
that steps taken to protect privacy establish that expectations of
privacy in an open field are legitimate."' 83 Thus, the fact that
Thornton and Oliver so effectively fenced and posted their land
that no one but determined government agents came upon their
marijuana plants does not render an expectation of privacy in
such circumstances "legitimate". In Justice Powell's opinion,
"[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to
conceal assertedly 'private' activity. Rather, the correct inquiry
180 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest does
not authorize search of premises beyond immediate area from which arrestee might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence).
18! Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 n.9.
82 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468 (Justice Taft suggests "[a] standard which would for-
bid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by govern-
ment officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has
been known heretofore.")
183 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182.
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the per-
sonal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment."184 In a footnote Justice Powell goes further: "Certainly
the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment should
shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent
choose to erect barriers and post 'No trespassing' signs."180
Not a single citation impedes the flow of this novel argu-
ment: the Justice's own voice of authority and "certainty" alone
commend its reasoning to us. And indeed, as search-and-seizure
law, this argument has nothing else to commend it;1"' it turns on
a kind of verbal sleight of hand that has no place in principled
adjudication. Searches and seizures conducted by the govern-
ment are legitimate, that is, lawful, when they are "reasonable"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Under Katz,
however, no Fourth Amendment search occurs unless there is a
"reasonable" expectation of privacy. Reasonableness in this lat-
ter context of course has nothing to do with lawful conduct, but
adding "legitimate" to "reasonable"-as the court did in Oli-
ver 187-creates a through-the-looking-glass Fourth Amendment
proposition: no one who possesses contraband can legitimately
expect not to be found out.
Here, as in Justice Taft's Olmstead opinion, the Constitu-
tion is not about rights and values and about the relationship of
the government and the individual. Rather, like Justice Taft,
Justice Powell sees the law, and indeed, the Fourth Amendment
itself, as enacting a battle between the forces of good (the gov-
ernment) and the forces of evil (persons with criminal intent).
So powerful is this conception of the legal universe, and ulti-
mately, of the body politic, that it bends language to its own
uses.
Finally, Justice Powell dismisses as unfounded and imprac-
tical the petitioners' arguments that expectations of privacy in
,84 Id. at 182-83 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 182 n.13.
188 The Court's own precedent holds unambiguously that expectation-of-privacy
analysis turns on "the sorts of uses to which a given space is susceptible, not the manner
in which [the defendant] was in fact employing it." Id. at 191 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), overruled on other grounds by
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991)).
187 Oliver, 466 U.S. 170.
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posted land should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 88 The
answer is again very short indeed: "The language of the Fourth
Amendment itself answers their contention."' 8 However, Justice
Powell continues, a case-by-case approach would in any event be
unworkable, because "police officers would have to guess before
every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located
contraband in an area sufficiently secluded."'"" Here again, we
are in a world where simple rules are the best rules, and the
government's convenience can trump individual rights.
C. Scott
Judge Hancock's opinion for the Scott majority of the New
York Court of Appeals presupposes (and in Justice Marshall's
sense, "promotes")1 91 a legal, ethical, and political universe anti-
thetical to that of Oliver. First, Judge Hancock's voice is not
that of a boss laying down the law. Rather, like Justice Brandeis
in Olmstead, 92 he is an individual speaking to individuals, the
teacher who must learn in order to teach. Instead of asserting a
conclusion, Judge Hancock begins his analysis of the search and
seizure issues by setting Oliver in historical perspective, narrat-
ing the Hester-Olmstead-Katz-Oliver sequence. 10 3 Having thus
educated court and reader, he notes that Oliver's "holding that
the Amendment covers persons, houses, papers, and effects-but
not land-seems directly contrary to the basic concept of post-
Katz decisions that the Amendment protects a person's privacy,
not particular places."1 94 Inherent in this "seeming" is a kind of
judicial humility, an invitation to the reader to look at the cited
cases and come to an independent conclusion. For the court,
Judge Hancock "agrees" with Justice Marshall's dissent identi-
fying the inconsistency between Oliver and Katz.'9 5
Since the Supreme Court's reading of the language of the
188 Id. at 181.
'8, Id.
0, Id.
Id. at 198 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
'"3 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 478-85, 593 N.E.2d at 1328-34, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 920-26.
'9' Id. at 485, 593 N.E.2d at 1334, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
195 Id. at 485-86, 593 N.E.2d at 1334-35, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27; see also Oli'er, 466
U.S. at 185-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Fourth Amendment has no bearing on adjudication under article
I, section 12, most of Scott is devoted to the court's rejection of
Oliver's holding that there is, per se, no reasonable expectation
of privacy in fenced or posted land."9 6 The court announces its
holding in forthright, everyday language that "translates" the
law: "A constitutional rule which permits State agents to invade
private lands for no reason at all-without permission and in
out-right disregard of the owner's efforts ... is one that we can-
not accept . . . . ,, Rather than play the neutral, Oracle-at-Del-
phi-like vehicle through which transcendent law is spoken,
Judge Hancock admits that the court is made up of subjects who
choose how to rule after considering conflicting constitutional in-
terpretations. As explained by Judge Hancock, this rejection is
profoundly a matter of "core. principle[s],"' 98 of fundamental
democratic values: the rule in Oliver offends against the citizen's
rights to privacy and autonomy and the government's obligation
to deal honestly and fairly with its citizens. Scott is about values
in the way Oliver is about law enforcement.
First, the court rejects Oliver's analysis because, in its cate-
gorical emphasis on places, not people, Oliver contradicts Katz
even while purporting to apply it, thus unsettling post-Katz
search and seizure law. Further, in Judge Hancock's view, Oliver
is incompatible with "the right to be let alone-the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."'' 9 This use of Justice Brandeis's vernacular "translation"
of the Fourth Amendment exemplifies the court's idea of the
Bill of Rights as a source of values, not a set of do's and
don'ts2 0o
The court finds further reasons to reject Oliver in the vari-
ous protections traditionally afforded to property rights, protec-
tions that imply fundamental respect for privacy and individual
autonomy. Judge Hancock cites the Supreme Court's own pro-
nouncement that "property rights reflect society's explicit recog-
nition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas,
and therefore should be considered in determining whether an
29 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 485-90, 593 N.E.2d at 1334-38, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 926-30.
Id. at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
'" Id. at 487, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
'9 Id. at 486-87, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (quoting Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
200 Keta, 79 N.Y.2d at 504, 593 N.E.2d at 1349, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
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individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable. ' ' 20 ' The exis-
tence of laws prohibiting unauthorized entry onto private prop-
erty discredits Oliver still further: like the government agents in
Olmstead, the officers in Oliver, Thornton, and Scott were
breaking the law. Again, Judge Hancock quotes Justice Bran-
deis: "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example...
. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law."20 2 Once more, Judge Hancock's opinion presupposes a
community in which teaching/learning, not giving/taking orders,
is the dominant discourse.
With thoughtful understatement, Judge Hancock finds
"troublesome" Oliver's "suggestion that the very conduct discov-
ered . . . could be considered . . . in determining whether the
police had violated defendant's rights."203 This "after-the-fact
justification for illegal police conduct" is incompatible with
"fairness as an essential concern in criminal jurisprudence." 21"
Moreover, because law-abiding citizens may have good reasons
for keeping to themselves what they do on their secluded prop-
erty, blanket permission for police access ignores still another
basic democratic premise: "the only legitimate purpose for gov-
ernmental infringement on the rights of an individual is to pre-
vent harm to others. '205
In brief, Oliver presents the reader with an assertion (no ex-
pectation of privacy in fenced land beyond the curtilage) that
rests on further assertions ("open fields" are chiefly used for
farming, fencing and posting do not keep out the public, only
lawful activity creates a legitimate expectation of privacy) while
Scott invites the reader to a reasoned consideration of rights and
values.
D. Burger
In New York v. Burger206 Justice Blackmun speaks in the
I"' Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 487, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (quoting Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978)(Powell, J., concurring)).
2 Id. at 487, 593 N.E.2d at 1336, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 928 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
20 Id. at 488, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
204 Id.
0 Id. at 489, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
2- 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
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same authoritarian voice as Justice Powell in Oliver and Justice
Taft in Olmstead. It is a voice that constitutes community as an
epic struggle between crime and the state. Although more de-
tailed in its analysis than Oliver, the Burger majority opinion is
no more candid and no better reasoned. Like Oliver, it under-
mines settled search and seizure law while leaving the facade in-
tact, trivializing and shouldering aside the court of appeals's
principled concern that "administrative" searches under section
415 could be no more than pretexts for searches for evidence of
criminality.
Significantly, Justice Blackmun frames the issues presented
in Burger without a single mention of the Fourth Amendment.
Indeed, his statement of the Court's reasons for granting certio-
rari in Burger-" [b]ecause of the important state interest in ad-
ministrative schemes designed to regulate the vehicle-disman-
tling or automobile junkyard industry"2°'-places the emphasis
where it will remain throughout the opinion, not on the legiti-
macy of expectations of privacy, but on the government's power.
Burger's failings as reasoned discourse lie less in articula-
tion than in application of the law. It was settled by the time of
Burger that a warrantless search of business premises is consti-
tutional when the business in question is "pervasively regu-
lated. ' 208 In addition, the particular regulatory scheme must
provide a sufficient guarantee of certain and regular application
to provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a war-
rant.209 Finally, the regulation must be informed by a substantial
state interest and its search provisions must be necessary to fur-
ther that interest.2 10
Applying the first prong of this test, Justice Blackmun un-
accountably pronounces section 415-a(5)(a) of New York's Vehi-
cle and Traffic Law211 to be "clearly" pervasive regulation, an
"extensive" regulation of the vehicle-dismantling business.22
But his own (accurate) description of the provisions of section
415-a(5) immediately and starkly contradicts this assertion. The
regulations require only registering, displaying a registration cer-
207 Id. at 698.
208 Id. at 702.
209 Id. at 703 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)).
210 Id. at 702.
211 See supra note 61.
22 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703-04 (1987).
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tificate, and keeping an inventory log.213 Justice Blackmun's use
of emperor's-new-clothes rhetoric here is no more appropriate to
reasoned discourse than the conclusory assertions of Justices
Taft, Holmes, or Powell.
But Burger deals in conclusory assertions as well as naked
overstatement. Although the age of a regulatory scheme is a fac-
tor in determining whether it is pervasive, and auto-dismantling
is a relatively new industry, Justice Blackmun cures this defect
by declaring section 415-a(5)(a) the descendant of venerable
junk shop and second-hand shop regulations.2 1' How this histor-
ical analogy might operate to reduce a vehicle-dismantler's ex-
pectation of privacy is, however, not explained. And indeed, it
does not appear that these older industries were themselves
more than minimally regulated.215
The Court's conclusion that section 415-a(5)(a) "place[s]
appropriate restraints upon the discretion of the inspecting of-
ficers, ' 216 and thus satisfies the policies behind the warrant re-
quirement, is yet another example of adjudication by sheer rhe-
torical force majeure. Section 415-a(5)(a) guarantees certain and
regular alplication, according to Justice Blackmun, because it
requires that (1) only vehicle-dismantling and related industries
may be inspected (a seemingly tautological restriction), (2) only
during business hours may inspections take place, and (3) only
records and vehicles or vehicle parts may be inspected.1 Other
than proscribing midnight raids and washroom searches, it is
hard to see how section 415-a(5)(a) guides or limits official
discretion.
Moreover, under its provisions, government agents are au-
thorized to conduct searches of inventory that cannot possibly
reveal administrative violations. Although this means that sec-
tion 415-a(5)(a) can be used to circumvent the warrant require-
ment, and that its "administrative" aspects may well be purely
pretextual, the Court does not so much as mention this problem
in determining whether section 415-a(5)(a) fits within the ad-
ministrative search exception of the warrant requirement. This
213 Id. at 704.
214 Id. at 705-07.
213 See id. at 720 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 711.
217 Id. at 711-12.
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omission is all the more unsettling because the court of appeals's
opinion below turned on that very issue.
218
While the state undoubtedly has a substantial interest in
stemming the rising tide of vehicle theft, and warrantless inspec-
tions of vehicle dismantlers would doubtless serve that end, the
Court's bland analysis of that issue once again ignores whether a
purportedly administrative search that can discover only evi-
dence of criminality is constitutional.
Having concluded that section 415-a(5)(a) meets all of the
requirements of the administrative search exception, Justice
Blackmun belatedly addresses the issue that so troubled the
court of appeals, but he addresses it as a separate, and clearly
subsidiary, issue. According to Justice Blackmun, the court of
appeals's concern for the constitutionality of section 415-a(5)(a)
was the result of simple ignorance: the regulation only appeared
to the New York court to be a "pretext" because "the Court of
Appeals failed to recognize that a State can address a major so-
cial problem both by way of an administrative scheme and
through penal sanctions. ' 219 This explanation is as discourteous
as it is unsatisfactory. First, it accuses the seven judges of New
York's highest court of failing to recognize a proposition of the
most blinding obviousness. More importantly, it entirely begs
the question. What troubled the court of appeals was neither the
mere existence of section 415-a(5)(a) nor the possibility that an
administrative search might reveal evidence of criminality, but
rather, the fact that the provision broadly authorized searches
that could uncover only criminal violations. This was in fact the
situation in Burger. Although the defendant had neither the re-
quired license nor the required inventory book, the officers
searched his premises for stolen property-despite the fact that
there were no administrative violations that such a search could
uncover.
220
Yet the Supreme Court deals only glancingly and dismis-
sively with the tunnel that section 415-a(5)(a) excavates beneath
the Fourth Amendment: "Forbidding inspecting officers to ex-
amine the inventory [when the owner keeps no record of his in-
ventory] would permit an illegitimate vehicle dismantler to
238 See People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986).
2 1 Burger, 482 U.S. at 712-13.
220 Id. at 695.
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thwart the purposes of the administrative scheme and would
have the absurd result of subjecting his counterpart who main-
tained records to a more extensive search. 221 As in Oliver, effi-
cient law enforcement takes precedence over concern for indi-
vidual rights, and even over the Court's own precedent, which
forbids the use of administrative searches to uncover evidence of
222crimes.
Finally, Justice Blackmun sees no significance in the fact
that searches under section 415-a(5)(a) are conducted by police
officers, rather than by administrative agents:
As a practical matter, many States do not have the resources to assign
to enforcement of a particular administrative scheme to a specialized
agency ....
[W]e decline to impose upon the States the burden of requiring the
enforcement of their regulatory statutes to be carried out by special-
ized agents.223
One final time, concern for practical law enforcement is inter-
posed against the court of appeals's principled concerns about
the statutory provision.
E. Keta
Unlike Burger and like Scott and Justice Brandeis's Olm-
stead dissent, People v. Keta22 portrays the Constitution as a
source of fundamental democratic values. Indeed, Judge Titone
explicitly bases the majority's rejection of Burger on its failure
to serve constitutional "values" and distinguishes his own con-
cern for "ordered liberty" from the concern for "well-kept or-
der" manifested by the Supreme Court in Burger and by the
Scott-Keta dissenters.22
As Scott educates us about the Hester-Katz progression,
Keta educates the citizen/reader about the "perplexing" law of
administrative searches before beginning its appraisal of Burger.
we are equipped and invited to participate in the court's analy-
22 Id. at 716.
See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
22 Burger, 402 U.S. at 717-18 (emphasis added). Yet it might equally be argued that
"high crime" states can ill afford to use police officers for administrative enforcement
12 People v. Keta, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
2 Id. at 501, 593 N.E.2d at 1345, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
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sis. But the court takes the reader's education a step farther in
Keta, pausing for a history lesson on the notorious Writs of As-
sistance.226 Where Burger is shrilly concerned with the crisis of
the moment, Keta, like the Olmstead dissent,227 sees a complex
reality that takes past and future into account, seeking to under-
stand the lessons of history and our responsibility to the future.
Judge Titone concludes that as the repressive Writs of Assis-
tance fueled the American Revolution, sweeping and warrantless
"administrative searches" put at risk the future of democracy.228
Since the stakes were thus so high, the Burger Court had a
special duty to employ "close analysis," according to Judge
Titone, but failed to meet the occasion. 229 The Keta majority
refutes Burger point by point, meticulously. First, Judge Titone
quotes the Supreme Court's own precedent to demonstrate that
before Burger, the Court itself assumed that the Fourth Amend-
ment would not tolerate purported "administrative" searches
that are actually searches for evidence of criminality. 230 More-
over, he adds, this assumed limitation is "analytically sound,"
for without it, the exception could "swallow" the warrant and
probable cause requirements.2 31 Next, Judge Titone examines
and rejects the Supreme Court's analysis: section 415-a(5)(a) is
neither "pervasive" regulation nor does it provide for such cer-
tainty and regularity of application as to obviate the need for a
warrant. More importantly, Judge Titone explains, the state's
interest in eradicating car theft is beside the point. The govern-
ment always has an interest in law enforcement and searches are
always useful, but the very purpose of the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 12 is "to provide a counterbalancing check
220 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
22 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-75.
228 Keta, 79 N.Y.2d at 497-98, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
229 Id. at 499, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
21 Id. at 498, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (citing Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. at 598 n.6 (1981) (warrant and probable cause requirements "pertain when com-
mercial property is searched for contraband or evidence of crime"); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (authorization of administrative searches on less than
probable cause will not "endange[r] time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal inves-
tigations")). It is characteristic of the tone of the Scott-Keta majorities that Judge
Titone does not accuse the Supreme Court of "failing to recognize" its own precedent,
while the Burger court accuses the New York court of just that. See supra notes 78-98
and accompanying text.
"21 Id. at 498-99, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
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on what may be done to individual citizens in the name of gov-
ernmental goals. 232
In Keta the court of appeals declines to address "our citi-
zens' legitimate fears about rising crime, 2 33 yet neither does it
belittle or lose sight of these concerns. Rather, Judge Titone an-
swers them with Benjamin Franklin's high-minded admonition
that "those who give up essential liberty to purchase a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety, ' '23  and
notes his own belief that constitutionally acceptable regulation
(including warrantless searches) of the vehicle dismantling in-
dustry can be drafted. In the end, there is a founded hope that
liberty and order can be reconciled.
Like Scott, then, Keta invites us to a conversation about
values, a conversation in which democracy and reason can in-
deed flourish. In sharp contrast, Oliver and Burger simply lay
down the law, relying on the voice of authority, our fear of
crime, and our masochistic romance with power to silence our
questions. In short, the court of appeals correctly, even necessa-
rily, rejected decisions of the United States Supreme Court that
violated one of the most fundamental of democratic guarantees:
the right to a reasoned explanation for the exercise of power.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
While Scott and Keta are wise decisions, well-supported by
reason and precedent, their federal counterparts, Oliver and
Burger, are not. Therefore, the court of appeals's principled dis-
agreement with the Supreme Court would appear to be sufficient
to justify its departure from federal precedent. To the Scott and
Keta dissenters, however, the notion that a state court may, in
interpreting its own constitution, simply disagree with the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of an identical provision is anath-
ema. Rather, the dissenters argue, in the absence of a textual
difference between the federal Constitution and a state constitu-
tion that would permit different interpretations of the words
used, only the existence of a "non-interpretive" factor, i.e., some
unique characteristic of the particular state that distinguishes it
from the rest of the nation, can justify the state court's depar-
-- Id. at 500, 593 N.E.2d at 1344, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
23 Keta, 79 N.Y.2d at 501, 593 N.E.2d at 1345, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
Id. at 501, 593 N.E.2d at 1345, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
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ture from the law of the land."3 5 In Scott and Keta, the dissent's
ire is piqued in particular by its perception that the court of
appeals had previously adopted and recently reaffirmed non-in-
terpretive analysis.23 Therefore, in failing to employ non-inter-
pretive analysis in Scott and Keta, the majority undermined
stare decisis.
The majority opinions in Scott and Keta in fact contain no
explicit discussion of methodology. Response to the dissent's
shower of vitriol is left to the concurring Judge Kaye, who sim-
ply denies that the court has ever adopted any particular meth-
odology for deciding state constitutional cases or that its deci-
sions in Scott and Keta signal a break from the past.27
These opinions together raise several issues for both the
tone and content of the discussion of state constitutional adjudi-
cation contrasts sharply with the reasonable discussion of search
and seizure. Indeed, all of the qualities that make the search and
seizure opinion such excellent constitutional discourse are en-
tirely lacking in the discussion of the state constitution. First,
the precedents cited by the dissent do not support its contention
that the court of appeals has, in the past, adopted non-interpre-
tive analysis in state constitutional cases, then "scuttled" it in
Scott and Keta. Second, the court has, in fact, failed to adopt
any consistent theory of state constitutional adjudication.
Rather, it relies on "non-interpretive factors" when they appear
to exist, invents them when they do not or, alternatively, ignores
the entire issue. The result of this approach is that where the
federal Constitution and the state constitution contain analo-
gous provisions, no litigator in New York can be sure of how to
raise or defend against a state constitutional claim.
Finally, while any reasoned, clearly explained methodology
would be better than the current disarray, the court of appeals
should explicitly reject the notion, fundamental to non-interpre-
tive analysis, that a state court may not reject Supreme Court
precedent unless it can advance some state-specific circumstance
to justify the departure. Such a requirement appears to be a re-
cent invention born of state court sensitivity to criticism that
their constitutional decisions reflect mere ideological disagree-
"I Id. at 510-11, 593 N.E.2d at 1351, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
236 Id. at 512-13, 593 N.E.2d at 1351-53, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944-45.
237 Id. at 504, 593 N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
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ment with the Supreme Court. In fact, this requirement conflicts
with the state courts' historic obligation to serve as the primary
defenders of citizens' individual liberties. Moreover, the notion
of "unique state characteristics" does not reflect the reality of a
nation in which fundamental values do not align with state
boundaries.23 There are not fifty-one separate discourses about
individual rights but rather a continuing national conversation
in which state courts may and should dissent in the interest of
their citizens' rights.
A. A History of the "New Federalism" Movement
A reader who receives the impression from the dissenting
and concurring opinions in Scott and Keta of having walked in
on a family feud with ancient origins may not be far wrong. As
Judge Kaye points out, the judges of the New York Court of
Appeals have been "uncommonly divided" for at least the past
five years over state constitutional law cases, particularly those
in which they have been called upon to interpret a provision of
the New York State Constitution more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court has already interpreted an analogous fed-
eral provision.239
By this time, so much has been written on "New Federal-
ism" by both judges and commentators, the sides in the debate
are so clearly drawn and the points of view so tenaciously held,
that participants in the argument, like members of a quarrel-
some family, possess an exclusive frame of reference and speak
in a shorthand comprehensible only to themselves.2 40
238 See Gardner, supra note 11, at 830-32.
239 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 503, 593 N.E.2d at 1346, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
240 The term "New Federalism," or, more precisely, "New Judicial Federalism" de-
scribes the recent emphasis on independent state constitutional analysis, particularly in
the area of individual rights. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' de-emphasis of those
rights is probably the single greatest impetus behind the New Federalism, a movement
that counts among its most committed adherents: Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New
York Court of Appeals (Kaye, supra note 7, at 399); Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice
Shirley Abrahamson (Shirley Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tax. L. RE. 1141 (1985)); New Jersey Su-
preme Court Justice Stuart Pollock (Stuart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate
Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707, 716 (1983)); Washington Su-
preme Court Justice Robert Utter (Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the
United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in
the Bathtub?, 64 WAs. L. REv. 19 (1989)); and former Oregon Supreme Court Judge
Hans Linde (Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18
1993] 1323
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Readers who missed the beginning of the argument may
therefore need some background. The New Federalism move-
ment is in essence an attempt to regain for state constitutions
the meaningful role they once held as the "primary guardian[s]"
of individual liberties. 241 At the time the federal Bill of Rights
was first drafted, it applied exclusively to actions by the federal
government. State bills of rights were thus the only restrictions
upon actions by state, as opposed to the federal, government. 242
Over the next two centuries, however, the central place of
state constitutions shifted. The Civil War created a spirit of na-
tional rather than state identification. Moreover, the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments placed the power to pro-
tect the civil rights of former slaves in the federal government.
The view of the states as the guarantors of liberty against fed-
eral overreaching began to be replaced by the view of the federal
government as the bulwark against abuse of power by the
states.243
This process was intensified in the twentieth century by the
application to the states of rights guaranteed in the first ten
amendments to the federal constitution through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under this model, the federal Constitution set a
GA. L. REv. 165 (1984)). See generally Robert N.C. Nix, Jr., Federalism in the Twenty-
First Century, in INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN SEARCH OF A GUARDIAN: FEDERALISM - TIE
SHIFTING BALANCE (Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989); William J. Brennan, Jr., Symposium on
the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 11 (1988).
241 Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 739 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
242 For example, in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) the
owner of a wharf in a Baltimore harbor brought a lawsuit claiming that the City of Balti-
more had caused several streams to run into the harbor carrying with them soil and
debris which made the harbor so shallow that the plaintiff's wharf became useless. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Barron argued that the City had taken his property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, the unani-
mous Court held that the Fifth Amendment was intended solely as a limitation on the
exercise of power by the federal government and is not applicable to the legislation of
states. Justice Marshall explained:
Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution pro-
vided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular govern-
ment as its judgment dictated.
In their several constitutions [the states] have imposed such restrictions
on their respective governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they
deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge
exclusively.
Id. at 247-48.
243 See Kaye, supra note 7, at 402.
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minimum level of protection for individual liberties that the
states could not violate. Thus, the federal Constitution became
the "primary guardian" of individual rights and state bills of
rights simply a second line of defense.4
The attempt to develop a modern role for state constitu-
tions must be seen in this historical context. When state bills of
rights were the only protection against state government power,
state courts performed a meaningful task if they simply inter-
preted state constitutional provisions identically to analogous
provisions of the federal Constitution. Once the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became available to limit
the power of state governments, however, it became clear that
state constitutions that did no more than mimic the federal
Constitution would be superfluous. And, in fact, this is precisely
what happened.4 5
During the years that Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, individual rights became increasingly federal-
ized. 4 Although a dual constitutional system remained theoreti-
cally intact, the federal Constitution became the dominant part-
ner. 24 7 Litigants who could do so invariably chose a federal
forum in which to challenge state violations of civil liberties.
Those who could not, namely criminal defendants, frequently
argued defenses based on federal rather than state law. State
constitutional claims, if raised at all, were simply tacked onto
federal arguments.245
State courts responded accordingly. They decided cases
under the federal Constitution, occasionally adding that the
same outcome was required under the state constitution. 240 In a
244 See id. at 404-05.
2,5 See Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HAMY.
C.R-CL L. REv. 271 (1973) [hereinafter Project Report].
2,6 Id. at 274.
247 Kaye, supra note 7, at 404.
2,8 Project Report, supra note 245, at 274.
249 This procedure had the potential for causing problems when the losing parties in
state court sought Supreme Court review. Before 1983 ambiguity as to the legal basis for
a state court's decision was generally resolved by a finding by the Supreme Court that
the case had been decided as a matter of state law and that therefore the Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction to review it. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), however, the
Supreme Court reversed this presumption and announced that henceforth where a state
court fails to make clear that its decision rests on state or federal grounds, the court will
accept "as the most reasonable explanation that the state decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so." Id. at 1041. Only if the state
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time of expanding federal constitutional rights, few if any, state
courts seriously considered the possibility of granting broader
protection under their state constitutions. Conversely, since the
states were bound by minimum federal standards, no practical
purpose would be served by determining that the state constitu-
tion granted less protection than the federal Constitution.
Therefore, state constitutional adjudication languished.25 0
Unsurprisingly, the "New Federalism" movement grew as
the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist
set about contracting federal rights. 5' Initially, a new cumber-
some system of constitutional litigation developed. Courts accus-
tomed to deciding cases. under the Fourteenth Amendment con-
tinued to do so. Their decisions would then be reversed and
remanded by the Supreme Court. Back in the state court, state
constitutional claims would then for the first time be seriously
considered. In the New York Court of Appeals, as in many other
state courts, this second round frequently resulted in a holding
that state constitutional requirements exceeded those of the fed-
eral Constitution in the particular case.252
An increasing number of judges and commentators criti-
cized this state court practice of deciding federal before state
claims.2 53 They urged that it made more sense for a state court
to decide a case first on state law grounds. If a state statute or
action were found to meet state constitutional standards, only
then would a court determine if it also provided the minimum
federal level of protection. If it were struck down on state
grounds, on the other hand, there would be no reason to con-
sider the federal claim at all. This "primacy approach" to state
constitutional litigation would, its proponents argued, not only
help to relieve the overloaded federal dockets, but it would also
allow state court judges, whose expertise was presumably in the
area of state rather than federal law, to devote more time to
court decision "indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent grounds" will the Supreme Court decline to review
the decision. Id.
250 Project Report, supra note 245, at 273 n.16.
251 Oliver and Burger are, of course, prime examples of the Court's deemphasis of
individual rights.
252 See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986).
253 See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 390 (1980).
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these issues, thereby resulting in the .development of state con-
stitutional jurisprudence.254
If state courts have the unquestioned right-some would
say duty-to adopt a primacy approach to constitutional claims
not yet considered by the Supreme Court, (the situation in
Upton), they should have similarly unfettered freedom to inter-
pret provisions of a state constitution differently from interpre-
tations already given by the Supreme Court to analogous provi-
sions of the federal constitution (the situation in Scott and
Keta). Indeed, there is no dispute whatsoever that " . . . the
states .. have sovereign powers. When their courts interpret
State statutes or the State Constitution, the decisions of these
courts are conclusive if not violative of Federal law. Although
state courts may not circumscribe rights guaranteed by the Fed-
eral Constitution, they may interpret their own law to supple-
ment or expand them.' '2rs Despite the lack of any qualifications
by the Supreme Court on a state court's power to interpret its
own constitution, as the dissent and concurrence in Scott and
Keta illustrate, a baffling dispute has materialized in state
courts concerning the methodology a state court should employ
in deciding when it will surpass the Supreme Court in protecting
individual rights under a state constitution. On one side of the
debate are those who argue that our dual constitutional system
'" The failure of the Massachusetts Supreme Court to employ a primacy approach
to the state constitution was criticized by Justice Stevens in an exasperated concurrence
in Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735-39 (1984). In Upton the Massachusetts
Supreme Court rested its decision on the Fourth Amendment without deciding first
whether the warrant in question was valid under state law. The Massachusetts court,
said Justice Stevens,
thereby increased its own burdens as well as ours. For when the case returns to
that court, it must then review the probable-cause issue once again and decide
whether or not a violation of the state constitutional protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures has occurred. If such a violation did take place,
much of that court's first opinion and all of this court's opinion are for naught.
If no such violation occurred, the second proceeding in that court could have
been avoided by a ruling to that effect when the case was there a year ago.
Id. at 735-36 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Moreover, Justice Stevens asserted that the Massachusetts Court's methodology not
only made for needless work, but also disparaged the rights retained by the people of
Massachusetts under their own constitution when it "refused[d] to adjudicate their very
existence because of the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution of the United
States. Id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"I People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 503 N.Y.S.2d 907,
911 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
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permits a state court faced with the task of deciding an issue
already decided by the Supreme Court simply to construe its
own constitution as it deems appropriate, taking into considera-
tion the "various factors that constitute sound constitutional
analysis. ' 256 Accordingly, it may turn to the United States Su-
preme Court's opinions, both majority and dissenting, as sources
of wisdom, but as with any persuasive authority, sources deserv-
ing critical scrutiny, not blind obedience.257
Others would reverse this presumption of independence and
argue that state courts should adhere to the federal constitu-
tional interpretation unless some peculiarity of the state dictates
a different interpretation is preferable. The factors frequently
listed as justifying divergence from the Supreme Court include
"interpretive" factors-such as difference in the texts and his-
tory of the two constitutions-and "non-interpretive fac-
tors"-such as pre-existing state law, matters of particular state
or local concern, state traditions and distinctive public attitudes.
In sum, the question for non-interpretivists is whether "distinc-
tive and identifiable attributes of a state government, its laws,
and its people justify recourse to the state constitution as an in-
dependent source for recognizing and protecting individual
rights. '2 58
B. State v. Hunt:259 A Model of State Constitutional Discourse
The debate concerning non-interpretive analysis in state
constitutional adjudication moved from the pages of law reviews
into the courts with mixed results. One example of excellent
state constitutional discourse takes place in the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in State v. Hunt where competing theories of state
constitutional methodology were advanced in separate concur-
rences by Justices Handler and Pashman. In Hunt the New
Jersey Supreme Court rejected the United States Supreme
Court's conclusion that telephone billing records are not entitled
to Fourth Amendment protection 60 and concluded that the eq-
uities "so strongly favor protection of a person's privacy interest
256 State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 960 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 960.
258 Id. at 967 (Handler, J., concurring).
259 Id. at 952.
260 Id.
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in his toll billing records that the Court should apply higher
standards than the federal constitution. '" 2 1 As in Scott and
Keta, the majority opinion in Hunt deals simply with the search
and seizure issue and leaves the issue of state constitutional ad-
judication to separate opinions.
Justice Handler takes the non-interpretivist position, argu-
ing in favor of the presumption that a state court should follow
the lead of the Supreme Court when interpreting provisions of
the state constitution analogous to provisions in the federal Con-
stitution. He begins his opinion, however, by acknowledging that
the federal Supreme Court itself has recognized the sovereign
right of each state to adopt in its own constitution individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the federal
Constitution. 62 He points to the growing frequency with which
state courts have done just that and praises the New Jersey Su-
preme Court for being "fully responsive to its judicial role in
ultimately resolving questions that concern its citizens."20 3
Justice Handler next points out what he perceives neverthe-
less to be "a danger ... in state courts' turning uncritically to
their state constitutions for convenient solutions to problems
not readily or obviously found elsewhere." He warns that the
eventual outcome of such an "expedient approach" may be the
"erosion or dilution of constitutional doctrine" and cites com-
mentators who have made this point."" He fears that "it would
be unfortunate if the decision [in Hunt] were cast in that light."
Justice Handler concedes that there is no mandate that a
state court explain itself when it invokes its state charter to
achieve a result unavailable under federal law and recognizes
that using the state constitution to avoid restrictive federal rules
can be regarded as a sign of healthy federalism for which no jus-
tification is required. Having said all this, however, he points out
that our national judicial history and traditions closely wed fed-
eral and state constitutional doctrine. Furthermore, "a consider-
able measure of cooperation must exist in a truly federalist sys-
tem and some consistency and uniformity in certain areas of
263 Id. at 955.
162 Id. at 962 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Prunyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)).
2" Id. at 963 (Handler, J., concurring).
I" d. at 963-64 (Handler, J., concurring).
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judicial administration is desirable. '265 For this reason, state
courts should be "sensitive to developments in the federal law"
and recognize that opinions of the United States Supreme
Court, while not controlling "are nevertheless important guides
on the subjects which they squarely address. "266
Justice Handler concludes from these facts that it is "appro-
priate to identify and explain standards and criteria for deter-
mining when to invoke our State Constitution as an independent
source for protecting individual rights. '2 7 He then proceeds to
discuss at length and with extensive citation to a broad range of
authority, the non-interpretive factors that should be consid-
ered. He concludes that "the explanation of standards such as
these demonstrates that the discovery of unique rights in a state
constitution does not spring from pure intuition but, rather,
from a process that is reasonable and reasoned. '268
Justice Pashman's opinion, in which he addresses the points
raised by Justice Handler, is equally thoughtful and judicial in
tone. 69 He concedes that the New Jersey Supreme Court "has
not to date set forth any rules, principles or theories explaining
when it will go beyond the federal courts in protecting constitu-
tional rights and liberties- but rather has simply stated the
court's undoubted power to construe the New Jersey Constitu-
tion in accord with our own analysis of the right at issue."210 He
consequently "applaud[s] Justice Handler's thoughtful effort to
rationalize our cases in this area and to analyze when divergent
state and federal constitutional interpretations are appropri-
ate. ' 27 1 He then goes on to explain precisely why he believes the
court should reverse Justice Handler's presumption in favor of
state/federal uniformity unless particular state reasons exist to
diverge and instead should perform an independent state consti-
tutional analysis unless particular reasons indicate that con-
formity to federal law would be preferable.
In support of his position Justice Pashman first points to
the fact that independent analysis "strengthens the safeguards
... Id. at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
266 Id.
267 Id. at 965 (Handler, J., concurring).
Id. at 967 (Handler, J., concurring).
26 Id. at 958-62 (Pashman, J., concurring).
270 Id. at 959-60 (Pashman, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring).
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of fundamental liberties,"2 72 which is what state courts were
designed to do. Second, he notes the advantages of diversity of
constitutional analysis over uniformity, explaining that if state
supreme courts are not discouraged from independent constitu-
tional analysis, they may serve as laboratories for testing com-
peting interpretations of constitutional concepts. Third, he ex-
plains that the structure of our federal system does not impose
on states the strong limitations imposed on the Supreme Court
which must interpret laws for a "vastly diverse nation 273 and
which lack familiarity with local conditions. After discussing
these federalism concerns further, Justice Pashman concludes
that "where the state court perceives that the federal constitu-
tion has been construed to protect the fundamental rights and
liberties of our citizens inadequately, it cannot shrink from its
duty to act.2 7 4
Together these opinions surely invite the reader to a conver-
sation in which democracy can flourish. Both participants ap-
pear to proceed on the premise that they are engaged in a diffi-
cult joint enterprise rather than a battle. They share the goal of
finding the desirable delicate balance between state and federal
power and disagree only as to the means of achieving it. They
seek to explain and persuade rather than to "win." Both opin-
ions present opposing views in their best light. The authors' own
views are expressed with a candid admission of subjectivity: "In
my estimation" and "I offer my own analysis."217 While the de-
bate may continue, the writers' positions at least were clearly
stated and reasons given to support them thus allowing the
reader to participate in the discussion.
C. Scott and Keta as State Constitutional Discourse
Measured by James Boyd White's "standards of excellence"
the dissent and, to a lesser extent, the concurrence in Scott and
Keta suffer by comparison to Hunt. Immediately striking is the
nastiness of the dissent. Instead of explaining his views, Judge
Bellacosa resorts to name-calling. Rather than pointing out what
appear to him to be the disadvantages of the majority's ap-
272 Id. (Pashman, J., concurring).
273 Id. at 961 (Pashman, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 962 (Pashman, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 958 (Handler, J., concurring); id. at 965 (Pashman, J., concurring).
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proach, he sarcastically characterizes the thoughtful majority
opinion, as a "jurisprudential Rubicon '2 78 and an "Articles of
Confederation time warp," 277 simply to denigrate it. Instead of
engaging in a conversation with the rest of the court, he ridicules
it. The dissent's unjustified ad hominem accusations that the
majority is unprincipled and ideological contrast unfavorably
with Justice Handler's tactful suggestion that the explanation of
non-interpretive standards will spare the court the inaccurate
charge that it is acting on the basis of intuition rather than
reason.
278
Even more troublesome than the tone of the dissent is the
fact that although Judge Bellacosa is apparently a strong propo-
nent of non-interpretive analysis, he fails to point to a single
reason besides uniformity why the court should look to such
standards instead of simply engaging in independent analysis of
the state constitution. Instead of weighing the value of uniform-
ity against other, conflicting values, he merely repeats that the
Supreme Court has "definitively ruled" on the search and
seizure question and that such "definitive decisions of the high-
est Court in the land" should not be ignored on the basis of
"mere ideological disagreement. 2 79 "Ideological disagreement,"
as far as one can tell from the dissent, is simply disagreement
with the reasoning of a Supreme Court decision on the merits
rather than on the basis of non-interpretive factors. Judge Bel-
lacosa gives no reason for adhering to decisions of the Supreme
Court other than that the Supreme Court is Supreme.
The dissent dismisses the majority's well-founded concern
that the Supreme Court in Oliver and Burger has undermined
the theoretical foundations on which much of New York's search
and seizure law has been based and its conclusion that the new
rules now conflict with pre-existing state law (a circumstance
that should even qualify as a non-interpretive factor). Rather,
Judge Bellacosa asserts, without citation to authority, that "it is
the direct impact of the United States Supreme Court's rulings
on New York law that should be significant, not this Court's his-
278 Scott, 79 N.Y. at 506, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
277 Id.
278 Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
279 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 593 N.E.2d at 1350-51, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43 (Bel-
lacosa, J., dissenting).
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torical reprises of the United States Supreme Court's own artic-
ulations on a particular subject." 2 0 This characterization belit-
tles the majority's reasonable point and, more importantly, gives
no reasons to support the conclusion that a Supreme Court deci-
sion can "unsettle prior state law" only when it directly conflicts
with it.
In contrast to the justices of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, who take such pains to set out opposing views fairly, the
dissent seems purposely to misinterpret the majority's reason-
ing. For example, the majority refers to various sections of New
York's criminal, environmental and general obligation laws to
support the proposition central to the case: the expectation of
privacy on one's own property is one that society regards as rea-
sonable, otherwise it would not have permitted property owners
to post their land or provided for the punishment of trespass-
ers.281 Judge Bellacosa, however, characterizes this point as a
claim that New York's laws with respect to private property are
unique-a non-interpretive basis for departure from the Su-
preme Court.2 2 He then scathingly demolishes this argu-
ment-one the majority does not make-by pointing out that
these laws are not in any way peculiar to New York.
Similarly, the dissent transforms the majority's reasonable
assertion that an independent construction of the state constitu-
tion is appropriate when the Supreme Court "dramatically nar-
rows fundamental constitutional rights that our citizens have
long assumed to be part of their birthright"28 3 into the ridiculous
recognition of "some constitutional 'birthright' of auto disman-
tling businesses. 284 Having thus characterized the issue, he is
able easily to conclude that no such right exists and that Keta
"simply involves legitimate and statutorily authorized adminis-
trative regulation with reasonable allowance for investigative
and prosecutorial follow-up." 2 6 Finally, the careful historical
comparison between administrative searches and certain fea-
tures of writs of assistance286 becomes in Judge Bellacosa's
Id. at 511, 593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (Beflacosa, J., dissenting).
28, Id. at 487, 593 N.E.2d at 1335-36, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927-28.
282 Id. at 510-11, 593 N.E.2d at 1351, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
28 Keta, 79 N.Y.2d at 497, 593 N.E.2d at 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
284 Id. at 512, 593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (Bellacoma, J., dissenting).
285 Id.
281 See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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hands the obviously foolish "concern that the colonial 'writs of
assistance' will be reinstituted. 28 7
Judge Kaye's gentle concurrence is simply devoted to de-
fending the majority against the dissent's charge that it engaged
in ideological decision-making rather than explaining what the
court's methodology is or should be when it diverges from Su-
preme Court precedent.288 While Judge Kaye's defensiveness is
understandable, the opinion nevertheless is unsatisfactory. Al-
though the tone of the decision is reasonable, the reasons are not
forthcoming. She does little better than Judge Bellacosa in ex-
plaining to the reader why the court should not employ strict
non-interpretive analysis but should instead interpret the state
constitution independently.289
The trouble with these decisions is not that it is unseemly
for members of the state's highest court to squabble in public,
but that they fail to discuss the important questions that de-
serve to be addressed. This failure to address the issues squarely
has resulted in a situation in which not only are litigators unsure
whether the court of appeals employs non-interpretive analysis,
but the members of the court themselves appear unsure of what
methodology they employ. The rage of the dissent is not about
the failure of the court of appeals to adopt its view of non-inter-
pretive analysis in Scott and Keta. Rather, it arises from Judge
Bellacosa's perception that the court already had adopted non-
interpretive analysis in prior cases and was now cavalierly aban-
doning it. This failure to follow precedent, according to the dis-
sent, constitutes a "sub silentio overruling"2 90 of prior cases that
have required noninterpretive analysis and thus undermines
"stare decisis by pulling the analytical props out from under
several of [the] Court's guiding precedents. '291
287 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 512, 593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
288 Id. at 502-06, 593 N.E.2d at 1346-48, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 938-40 (Kaye, J.,
concurring).
289 The fuzziness of Judge Kaye's opinion is noteworthy in that it stands in sheer
contrast to the clarity of her writing on state constitutional adjudication in various law
review articles. The disparity leads to the conclusion that in her concurrence in Scott
and Keta she was exercising her well-known talent as a peacemaker and consensus-
builder rather than her capacity for critical legal thinking.
210 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 513, 593 N.E.2d at 1353, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
291 Id. at 507, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
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Judge Kaye, on the other hand, simply denies that the court
of appeals ever adopted non-interpretive analysis and declares
that she is satisfied that the grounds recited in the majority de-
cisions are fully in accord with the New York Court of Appeals'
precedents."2 2 Thus, the debate in Scott and Keta is not about
what the court's methodology should be in the future, but rather
about what it has been in the past. The reader who turns back
to the majority opinion to determine first, what methodology the
court in fact employed and second, whether in employing that
methodology the court broke new ground, will not find any
answers.
In Scott the majority says that it "declines to accept any
rigid method of analysis" and denies that it ever has adopted
any "fixed analytical formula for determining when the proper
protection of fundamental rights requires resort to the state con-
stitution.2 93 In Keta the majority says even less about method-
ology. It simply asserts its power to decide cases under the state
constitution independently of Supreme Court interpretation of
parallel federal constitutional provisions. 294 It points to the fact
that article I, section 12 and the Fourth Amendment are worded
similarly and therefore indicate a policy of uniformity. At the
same time, it cites numerous cases in which the court has found
this policy to be less important than other considerations, for
example, when a "sharp or sudden change in direction by the
United States Supreme Court dramatically narrows fundamental
constitutional rights that our citizens have long assumed to be
part of their birthright."2 95 The court concludes that where, as
here, "the rules governing official intrusions on individuals' pri-
vacy become muddied and the constitutional guarantees repre-
sented by article I, Section 12 concomitantly diluted," uniform-
ity must give way. 96
The court's reasons for rejecting Oliver and Burger make
good sense.297 Yet whether the court's reasoning is "non-inter-
pretive analysis," as defined by courts and commentators, is un-
clear. The court's opinion seems almost purposely ambiguous on
292 Id. at 503, 593 N.E.2d at 1346, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (Kaye, J., concurring).
3 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 490-91, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
" Keta, 79 N.Y.2d at 495-96, 593 N.E.2d at 1341, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
29" Id. at 497, 593 N.E.2d at 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 478-502, 593 N.E.2d- at 1330-46, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922.38.
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this point. For example, when the majority concludes that fol-
lowing federal precedent would unsettle state law by rejecting
the rationale underlying many prior cases,29 8 it seems to employ
a frequently mentioned non-interpretive factor. As the dissent
points out, however, no New York cases would be directly over-
ruled should the court follow Oliver or Burger.2 9 Thus, the law
would not in fact be unsettled, as it would have been had the
court of appeals decided the issues on state law grounds before
the Supreme Court issued contrary federal opinions.
Moreover, while the majority in Scott cites various New
York statutes that protect private property, it does not (contrary
to the dissent's assertion) claim that they are "unique" New
York considerations.300 The majority does claim for New York a
unique tradition of tolerance "of what may appear bizarre or
even offensive, '30 1 but it lifts those words out of their context in
an obscenity case, People v. P.J. Video.30 2 The court's point in
that case was that New Yorkers are uniquely tolerant when it
comes to free expression and therefore works of art that would
be considered obscene elsewhere might not be in New York. The
majority in Scott and Keta neither asserts that New Yorkers'
unique tolerance extends to drug possession or car theft, nor
suggests that citizens with conventional cultural tastes value
their privacy on their own property any less than do their avant
garde neighbors.
In sum, the court's methodology in Scott and Keta is un-
clear. It neither explicitly applies nor explicitly disclaims non-
interpretive analysis. The next question is whether this arguable
failure to apply non-interpretive analysis in Scott and Keta is,
as the dissent contends, a scuttling of stare decisis or, in the
words of the concurrence, "fully in accord" with precedent. An
examination of the court's prior cases provides no clear answer.
29 Id. at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
299 Id. at 511, 593 N.E.2d at 1351, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
300 Indeed the majority cites Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring), to support the proposition that "prop-
erty rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes
in certain areas, and therefore should be considered in determining whether an individ-
ual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." Id. at 488, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583
N.Y.S.2d at 929.
301 Id. at 488, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
... 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091
(1987).
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1. Non-Interpretive Precedent
a. People v. P.J. Video
The Scott-Keta dissent cites an impressive number of cases
to support its contention that the New York Court of Appeals
has in past cases adopted a strict method of non-interpretive
analysis. The most important of these is People v. P.J. Video,303
the first case in New York to use the words "non-interpretive
analysis." In that case defendants were charged with violating
the New York obscenity statute. They moved to suppress films
that had been seized under a search warrant issued on the basis
of an application containing only an itemized list of the sexual
acts depicted on the video cassettes, accompanied by a police
officer's conclusory affidavit that the acts listed were typical of
the contents of the films. The court of appeals affirmed the
granting of the motion, holding that under the Aguilar-Spinelli
rule,304 the affidavit was insufficient to allow the magistrate to
determine that the films as a whole appealed to predominantly
prurient sexual interest and lacked social value.
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court held that probable
cause should have been determined by applying the totality-of-
the-circumstances test under Illinois v. Gates,"- which would
permit the magistrate to focus simply on the explicit nature of
the pornographic material without considering the other statu-
tory elements of the crime. 0 ' On remand, the court of appeals
held that under the state constitution, probable cause should
continue to be measured by the stricter Aguilar-Spinelli
standard.307
The court begins its analysis by noting that courts and com-
mentators have identified "many considerations and concerns
upon which a state may rely" when deciding to interpret its own
constitution more broadly than the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the federal Constitution.308 The court cites Justice Han-
303 Id.
" This rule, based on Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), required courts to review both the basis of the informant's
knowledge and the reliability of the informant's information.
305 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
306 New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986).
117 See supra note 303.
30 P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 560. 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
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dler's concurring opinion in State v. Hunt,30 9 which discusses
non-interpretive analysis, and also cites a number of law re-
views. The court continues by explaining the difference between
interpretive and non-interpretive factors and stating that its de-
cision in P. J. Video rests on non-interpretive factors.
The court next recognizes a presumption of uniformity in
search and seizure cases based on the identity of language in the
state and federal constitutional provisions. It concludes, how-
ever, that "[w]hen weighed against the ability to protect funda-
mental constitutional rights, the practical need for uniformity
can seldom be a decisive factor. 3 10 Thus, the court explains that
it has "adopted independent standards under the State constitu-
tion when doing so best promotes 'predictability and precision in
judicial review of search and seizure cases and the protection of
the individual rights of our citizens'."31 In support of this pro-
position the court cites a number of search and seizure cases in
which the court has rejected Supreme Court precedent. The
court asserts that "these decisions reflect a concern that the
Fourth Amendment rules governing police conduct have been
muddied and judicial supervision of the warrant process diluted,
thus heightening the danger that our citizens' rights against un-
reasonable police intrusions might be violated. '312
The court goes on to state that the standard for evaluation
of search warrants previously employed established a "clear and
definable standard of review" 31 3 and therefore this is the stan-
dard that should continue to be applied to protect the rights of
New York citizens. The decision to rely on article I, section 12
rather than the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment pro-
nouncement" is, the court explains, "motivated ... by concerns
of federalism and separation of powers."314
The court notes that the New York warrant statute requires
that a magistrate issuing a warrant must carefully consider all
elements of the crime involved:
Given that our legislature has determined that an offensive, explicit
309 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982); see supra notes 258-74 and accompanying text.
o P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 912.
o" Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
Id. at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
303 Id. at 307, 501 N.E.2d at 563, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
314 Id.
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depiction of sexual conduct standing alone is not obscene, a magis-
trate cannot find probable cause that the crime of obscenity has been
committed solely on a showing that sexually oriented material is ex-
plicit and offensive. The Supreme Court's decision in this case has, in
effect, stated that certain elements of our statutory definition of a
crime are not significant. We are not free to similarly ignore or recast
the legislative mandate.3 15
Finally, the court explains that obscenity cases differ from
other crimes because, by definition, they are predicated on con-
temporary community standards. Thus, in determining whether
a particular work is obscene a magistrate must determine the
average New Yorker's evaluation of and reaction to the chal-
lenged material. This evaluation must include the "recognition
that New York is a State where freedom of expression and ex-
perimentation has not only been tolerated but encouraged." 31 '
When carefully analyzed, the decision in P.J. Video does
not support the dissent's claim that the court has adopted
mandatory non-interpretive analysis. While the court lists the
familiar non-interpretive factors, it describes them simply as
considerations on which a court "may" rely if it chooses to do
SO. 317 Likewise it recognizes the value of uniformity, but in the
same passage concludes that it is "seldom . . . a decisive fac-
tor."3 Rather, the court indicates that "predictability and pre-
cision in judicial review" and "the protection of the individual
rights of our citizens" are the most important factors in deciding
Fourth Amendment cases.319
Moreover, while the court points to a "unique" New York
tolerance for pornography, none of the precedents it cites in-
volve the First Amendment. They are cited, the court explains,
because they reflect the court's concern that the Supreme Court
has abandoned the clear, workable rules governing search and
seizure that had been in effect. 320 By diluting Fourth Amend-
ment protections, the Supreme Court heightened the danger
that citizens' rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
-15 Id. at 308, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
3, Id. at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
3,7 Id. at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911 ("State courts may interpret
their own law to supplement or expand [rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution].").
318 Id.
-' Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
320 Id.
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will be violated. Thus, while New York's traditional tolerance
may make careful probable cause determinations particularly ur-
gent in obscenity cases, the court's reasoning on the dilution of
the warrant requirement would be persuasive in a community
with far stricter community standards regarding sexually ex-
plicit material.
b. People v. Harris
The case to which the dissent refers as having recently reaf-
firmed the court of appeals's commitment to mandatory non-in-
terpretive analysis is People v. Harris.21 Once again, however,
the dissent's characterization of that case is not entirely accu-
rate. The defendant, Harris, was arrested in his home without a
warrant and made a statement. Subsequently, he made a second
statement in the police station. The first statement was sup-
pressed as the product of an unlawful arrest. At issue in the case
was whether the second statement was sufficiently attenuated to
be admissible.
The court of appeals found that the stationhouse confession
was tainted and suppressed it on Fourth Amendment grounds.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the police illegality
was in the entry, not in the arrest, and that the exit from the
apartment broke any causal connection between the illegality
and the later statement.22 The Court held that no attenuation
was required because the "deterrent value of suppressing this
type of statement was minimal. '323
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court of appeals
determined that although the defendant's stationhouse confes-
sion was admissible at his murder trial under federal standards,
it should have been suppressed under article 1, section 12. The
court concluded that "the Supreme Court's rule does not ade-
quately protect the search and seizure rights of citizens of New
York., 324
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals once again
notes that the identical language of the search and seizure provi-
sions of the two constitutional provisions supports uniform in-
72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1989).
322 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
3123 Id. at 21.
24 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 437, 570 N.E.2d at 1052-53, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.
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terpretation but concludes that, "sufficient reasons appearing,"
divergence is permissible.3 25 The court relies on its own prece-
dents, including P.J. Video, to support this proposition. The
court next explains the difference between interpretive and non-
interpretive analysis, lists the non-interpretive factors and as-
serts that in "employing this analysis in the past," it had "delin-
eated an independent body of search and seizure law under the
State Constitution to govern citizen-police encounters when do-
ing so best promotes "the protection of the individual rights of
our citizens.' ,326 Finally, the court turns to "the circumstances
peculiar to New York" and concludes "that although attenua-
tion may not be necessary to deter Payton violations under Fed-
eral law or in the Nation generally, the Supreme Court's rule is
not adequate to protect New York citizens from Payton viola-
tions" because of New York's stringent right to counsel rule. 27 A
leigthy discussion of the rule and its history follows.
Thus, Harris and P.J. Video arguably employ non-interpre-
tive analysis. Although neither case explicitly privileges it over
other approaches, in each the court does give as one of its rea-
sons for departing from Supreme Court precedent a unique fea-
ture of New York's criminal law. That by so doing the court
adopted and then reaffirmed mandatory application of non-in-
terpretive analysis is, however, not at all certain. Between the
1986 decision in P.J. Video and the 1991 decision in Harris, the
court of appeals decided a number of cases under the state con-
stitution in which the issue had already been decided by the Su-
preme Court as a matter of federal law. The Court's discussion
of methodology in these cases is contradictory and ambiguous
and by no means supports the contention that it was wedded to
non-interpretive analysis. In some cases, the court refers explic-
itly to non-interpretive analysis and in some it does not. In some
cases it appears to rely on non-interpretive factors, in others the
basis for the decision is unclear.3 28 Thus, anyone who read only
325 Id. at 437, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
311 Id. at 438, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
3 Id. at 439, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
328 For example, in People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552. 523 N.E.2d 291, 528
N.Y.S.2d 15 (1988), the court of appeals followed the Supreme Court's decision in hold-
ing that there is no expectation of privacy on non-posted land. In so doing, the court
simply asserted that the identical wording of the federal and state search and seizure
provisions supports a policy of uniform interpretation.
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the opinions in P.J. Video and Harris might or might not agree
Yet in People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), the
court departed from the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Place, a canine
sniff case, finding simply that "the analysis adopted by the Supreme Court ... has
threatened to undercut the right of our citizens to be free from unreasonable government
intrusions." Id. at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
In People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990), the
court held that as a matter of state constitutional law, in cases involving failure of the
prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence material to the defense, the applicable
harmless error standard should be a "reasonable possibility" of prejudice rather than the
"reasonable probability" standard adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Bagley. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). The majority opinion by Judge Kaye does not discuss non-
interpretive analysis, but simply cites a variety of cases in which the court of appeals has
"differed significantly from the Supreme Court's newest interpretation of the dictates of
the Federal due process standard." 76 N.Y.2d at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
522. The court declines to "abandon these accepted principles" for a less clear rule, Id.
Of interest is Judge Simons' concurrence in Vilardi, for in it he sets forth his perception
of the court's methodology:
In the past when we have departed from the Supreme Court's decisions, we
generally have done so because (1) we chose to adhere to our own established
law or because the Supreme Court has retreated from previously announced
rules (e.g., People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, supra; People v. Johnson, 66
N.Y.2d 398; People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417), (2) to establish a more protec-
tive State right by constitutionalizing a prior fully developed common-law
right (e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, or (3) because we have found a sepa-
rate State rule justified by concerns peculiar to New York State residents (see
Matter of Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70
N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987).
According to Judge Simons, in Vilardi, the analytical tests of P.J. Video were not
satisfied.
Again, in People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 226, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989),
the court rejected the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment ruling in Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and held that under the state constitution a police officer during a
stop and frisk cannot search the passenger compartment of the suspect's car. The deci-
sion does not mention "non-interpretive analysis," but simply notes that the court has
"demonstrated its willingness to adopt more protective standards under the State Con-
stitution 'when doing so best promotes' predictability and precision in judicial review of
search and seizure cases and the protection of the individual rights of our citizens." 74
N.Y.2d at 228, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 515 N.E.2d 898, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987), lists the
non-interpretive factors, cites P.J. Video, and concludes that "under non-interpretive
analysis there can be no doubt that the fairness of a criminal proceeding is of particular
state concern and New York has historically provided various protections in this area
above the federal constitutional minimum." Id. at 377. The court declines, however, to
depart from the Supreme Court's ruling in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984),
that the failure of. the police to take and preserve a breath sample in a drunk driving
case deprived defendant of the meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986),
the court of appeals held that the state's closing down a store that sold pornographic
books as a public nuisance affected the store's First Amendment rights. The burden was
therefore on the state to show that closing the store was the only available means to
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with the dissent that the court of appeals disregarded stare deci-
sis in Scott and Keta. A far more interesting question, however,
is whether the court of appeals undermined stare decisis in P.J.
Video itself. For, contrary to the impression conveyed by the
opinion in P.J. Video that non-interpretive analysis had an es-
tablished place in New York constitutional jurisprudence, an ex-
amination of the cases on which that decision relied reveals that,
in fact, it had never been employed or even mentioned before
P.J. Video.
After the inclusion of article I, section 12 in the New York
Constitution in 1938, the court of appeals followed a policy of
uniformity between that provision and the Fourth Amendment
based on the identical wording of the two provisions. 329 During
the 1970s, however, when an increasing number of the court's
Fourth Amendment decisions were reversed by the Supreme
Court, the court of appeals, like so many other state courts, first
began to interpret the state constitution more broadly than the
Supreme Court had interpreted the federal constitution. Al-
though a number of these pre-P.J. Video cases are cited in the
Scott and Keta dissent as examples of non-interpretive analysis,
they are no such thing.
abate the nuisance. The Supreme Court found no First Amendment violation and re-
manded. The court of appeals then held that the defendant's rights had been violated
under the state constitution. In its opinion the court notes that it is "bound to exercise
its independent judgment and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in the constitution of the United
States." Id. at 557. The court goes on to explain that the federal Bill of Rights estab-
lishes minimal standards for individual rights and that if comparable provisions of the
state constitution "are not to be considered purely redundant" they must "supplement
those rights to meet the needs and expectations of the particular state." Id. The court
does not mention non-interpretive analysis but cites P.J. Video for the proposition that
freedom of expression is an area in which there is great diversity among the states and
that New York "has a long history and tradition of fostering freedom of expression, often
tolerating and supporting works which in other states would be found offensive to the
community." Id. The court concludes that "the minimal national standards established
by the United States Supreme Court for first amendment rights cannot be considered
dispositive in determining the scope of this state's constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression." Id. at 557-58.
329 See, e.g., People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737-38, 445
N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1982); Kaye, supra note 7, at 417.
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c. People v. Johnson
The dissent's reliance on People v. Johnson,330 is a particu-
larly clear example of its misuse of precedent. In that case, the
court held that the warrantless arrest of the defendant was un-
lawful because the police acted solely upon hearsay information
provided by an informant that did not satisfy the reliability re-
quirement of the Aguilar-Spinelli rule . 31 The court declined to
apply the less stringent Illinois v. Gates332 totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances test recently adopted by the Supreme Court and in-
stead opted to retain the Aguilar-Spinelli rule as a matter of
state constitutional law.
In reaching this decision, however, Judge Simons, writing
for the majority, noted that Gates involved a search warrant, not
a warrantless arrest, and that the Supreme Court, in adopting
the less stringent test, had relied heavily on the fact that the
determination of probable cause had been made by a neutral
magistrate. For this reason and others, the court of appeals pre-
dicted that the Supreme Court might not apply the Gates test to
warrantless arrests. Judge Simons does not mention non-inter-
pretive analysis but simply quotes the court's frequently-made
statement that the identity of language between the state and
federal constitutions supports a policy of uniformity. He notes,
however, that this policy must yield "to a predictable, structured
analysis of the quality of evidence necessary to support intrusive
searches and seizures" particularly in cases in which the Su-
preme Court has not addressed a specific issue or provided guid-
ance in its Fourth Amendment rulings .. .
The dissent's claim that this opinion adopted strict non-in-
terpretive analysis finds no support in the opinion itself. Indeed,
the case is not one in which such analysis could have been em-
ployed; since the court was distinguishing Johnson from Gates,
uniformity was not an issue. In refusing to apply the Gates rule
to the new situation of a warrantless arrest, the court was not
diverging from federal precedent, but simply choosing to employ
primacy analysis, deciding a new issue in the first instance on
state rather than federal law grounds. In fact, the court sug-
-3- 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
331 See supra note 303.
.3 462 U.S. 213 (1983); see supra note 304 and accompanying text.
333 Id. at 407, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
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gested its belief that the Supreme Court would decide such a
case similarly. Indeed, the court's own language is self-contradic-
tory. There obviously can never be a "policy of uniformity" be-
tween article I, section 12 and the federal Constitution "in cases
in which the Supreme Court has not addressed a specific issue or
provided guidance in its Fourth Amendment rulings. '33
Finally, although the court makes an obeisance to the no-
tion of uniformity, it quickly makes clear that uniformity is but
a minor concern and must yield when "a predictable, structured
analysis" of the evidence indicates that it should.333 What con-
stitutes a "predictable, structured analysis" is nowhere ex-
plained. The opinion, however, contains no mention of any
unique state factors to justify its resort to the state constitution.
Instead, the court analyzes federal precedents which might sup-
port a Fourth Amendment claim and then decides the case as a
matter of state constitutional law.
d. Other Non-Interpretative Precedents?
Other cases decided around the same time as Johnson, all of
which are cited by the dissent in Scott and Keta as examples of
non-interpretive analysis, contain even less discussion of the
court's reasons for departing from federal precedent or are sim-
ply not on point . 3  For example, People v. Bigelow 33 7 contains
no mention of non-interpretive analysis. The court simply "de-
dine[s] to apply" without explanation the good faith exception
to the warrant requirement established by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Leon.33 s Similarly, in People v. Gokey,3  the
"" Id. at 407, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
"Id.
Not on point is People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.YS.2d
181 (1984), which held that a police officer's non-consensual entry into the defendant's
automobile to determine its VIN number on a stop solely for a traffic infraction violated
both the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court reversed the decision on
federal constitutional grounds. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 105 (1986). On remand the
court of appeals stated simply, "Where, as here, we have already held that the state
constitution has been violated we should not reach a different result following reversal
on federal constitutional grounds unless respondent demonstrates that there are ex-
traordinary or compelling circumstances." 67 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 494 N.E.2d 444, 445, 503
N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (1986).
66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985).
S8 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
"' 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1983).
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court of appeals departed from the Supreme Court's decision in
New York v. Belton,34 ° which involved the permissible scope of a
search incident to an arrest, saying simply that it "declines to
interpret the State Constitutional protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures so narrowly." 34'
Likewise, in People v. Elwell,342 a case involving standards
for informant reliability in warrant applications, the court says
no more than that "[t]o the extent that [federal cases] may be
read as imposing a less stringent test under the Federal Consti-
tution, we decline to construe the parallel provision of our State
Constitution similarly and adopt the rule set forth above as a
matter of State constitutional law. ' 343
These cases reveal that, for reasons nowhere explained, the
concept of "non-interpretive analysis" simply crept onto the
New York judicial scene in 1987 in P.J. Video and became em-
bedded there. With P.J. Video, a court that had regularly and
confidently departed from Supreme Court precedent when it be-
lieved such a course was in* the best interest of New Yorkers
suddenly became defensive about exercising its undoubted right
to decide cases under the state constitution. Nowhere, however,
did the court ever explicitly announce that it was adopting a
new methodology and give reasons for doing so, though in P.J.
Video and Harris it looked as though it were going through the
motions. As a result, in Scott and Keta the dissenting judges are
able to claim that the court has adopted and reaffirmed a rigid
methodology while the concurrence can deny that the court fol-
lows any methodology at all. Moreover, neither the dissent nor
the concurrence gives reasons why one methodology is preferable
to another in language that the reader might understand and the
3,0 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574,
rev'd 453 U.S. 454, remand 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982), the
court of appeals first held on Fourth Amendment grounds that after arresting the occu-
pant of a car the police may not contemporaneously search the passenger compartment
or closed containers within it. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the majority of
the court flip-flopped, concluding on a new rationale that the search that followed the
defendant's lawful arrest was permissible under the state constitution. The court noted
"[t]he identical wording of the two provisions does not proscribe our more strictly con-
struing the State Constitution than the Supreme Court has construed the Federal Con-
stitution." Id. at 51. The court nowhere mentions non-interpretive analysis.
3" Gokey, at 312, 457 N.E.2d 724, 469 N.Y.S.2d 619.
34- 50 N.Y.2d 231, 406 N.E.2d 471, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1980).
3 Id. at 235, 406 N.E.2d at 473, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
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litigator rely on.
2. The Need for Honest Legal Reasoning
In his article Honest Judicial Opinions, Robert A. Leflar,3N
former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, asks
the question whether judicial opinions should set forth courts'
real reasons for their decisions. He remarks that a court's failure
to state the real reasons for a decision can occur in opinions that
break new ground as well as in those simply decided by analogy
to old cases.3 45 He notes that "[a]n opinion that breaks new
ground is more honest if it sets out that fact clearly and does not
pretend that it is merely applying settled law. Lawyers and
other judges can be misled by that pretense.13 4 It is precisely
such a pretense that has resulted in the acrimonious opinions in
Scott and Keta.
In P.J. Video,3 47 which is now cited to support the conten-
tion that the court has adopted non-interpretive review, the
court indeed used the words "non-interpretive analysis," but did
so for the first time. Instead of making clear that it was employ-
ing a new methodology and giving reasons for its new direction,
however, the court simply listed the non-interpretive factors
"identified by courts and commentators" 34 8 and announced that
its determination "rests on non-interpretive grounds." 340, The
court then cited a number of cases in which it had in the past
applied the state constitution more broadly than the federal
Constitution, thus misleading the reader into believing that the
court was doing nothing new.
The court's failure to state clearly that it would (or would
not) henceforth employ non-interpretive review allowed it in
subsequent cases to adopt such analysis if the unique state fac-
tors existed, as in Harris,35° and reject it when they did not, as
in People v. Dunn.35 1 In some cases non-interpretive analysis is
11 74 Nw. U. L REv. 721 (1979).
345 Id.
"I Id. at 723.
3.7 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1987): see supra notes 302-19
and accompanying text.
Id. at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
11 Id. at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
--0 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1989).
-51 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990); see supra note 327.
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mentioned but not employed; in others it is not mentioned at
all.3 52 And as Judge Kaye herself pointed out, in a few cases
some judges found unique state factors while others did not, yet
still concurred in the result.
3 53
The absence of a fixed method of analysis accompanied by
the threat that in any given case rigid non-interpretive analysis
may be applied turng litigation into a crap shoot. "Whether judi-
cial opinions are or are not themselves law, we look to them for
our 'prophecies of what the courts will do in fact'. . . . The law-
making and law-retaining opinions are the ones whose quality
most concerns us. If they are honest and clear they furnish bet-
ter guidance to one who seeks to discover from them what the
next case will hold. 354
A litigator attempting to frame a state constitutional argu-
ment might do as well reading tea leaves as the decisions of the
court of appeals. Does an appellant's attorney risk losing a case
if he or she fails to produce sociological studies documenting the
peculiarities of New Yorkers? Must over-worked prosecutors re-
search state constitutional history to prove that uniformity is re-
quired? At this point, most lawyers would surely be well-advised
to discover some unique state interest at stake in his or her case.
For as long as the court continues to mention non-interpretive
analysis, whether or not it regularly applies it, no litigator is safe
ignoring it.
While any clear statement by the court of appeals would be
an improvement over the current ambiguity, the question still
remains as to what that statement should be. In the end, how-
ever, the entire notion of mandatory non-interpretive analysis
should be explicitly rejected.
Non-interpretive analysis is a judicially created restraint on
the power ,of state courts to fulfill their historic function of act-
ing as genuine protectors of individual liberty. Whether a state
court views itself as a first line of defense and regularly adopts a
primacy approach to the state constitution, 35 or whether it sim-
ply acts as a back-up to be called upon when the Supreme Court
312 See supra note 327.
3 79 N.Y.2d 474, 502, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1346, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 938 (1992) (Kaye,
J., concurring).
3" Leflar, supra note 341, at 737.
"' See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
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fails to be sufficiently protective, there is neither a constitutional
command nor a historical precedent which requires that it jus-
tify its actions on the basis of non-interpretive factors.
Indeed, such analysis is directly contrary to the very notion
of state constitutionalism. Nowhere is it suggested that a state
court that decides to rely on its state constitution rather than
the federal Constitution on an issue as yet undecided by the Su-
preme Court must engage in non-interpretive review. Should the
Supreme Court subsequently cut back on federal constitutional
protection in the same area, the state court is not required to
overturn pre-existing state constitutional law to be in conformity
with federal law, despite the absence of any unique state factors.
It therefore makes no sense to require the existence of such fac-
tors when, fortuitously, an issue happens to have reached the
Supreme Court before it is raised in state court.
Moreover, one of the advantages of state courts most dis-
cussed by courts and commentators is their ability to serve as
"laboratories" for federal courts.3  If state courts are entitled to
rely on state constitutions only when the citizens of the particu-
lar state differ from the rest of the body politic, then a state can
hardly serve as a useful laboratory. Finally, state constitutions
cannot act as the "primary guardians" of individual rights if
they can be relied upon only in unique situations2 7
The contradiction between a state court's unquestioned
power to interpret its own constitution and the self-imposed re-
quirement that it employ non-interpretive analysis is so appar-
ent that it is mystifying why state courts should be so troubled
by it. Proponents of the notion appear to believe that without it,
state courts are bound to abandon all notions of judicial re-
straint and will engage in purely ideological decisionmaking.a 8
Implicit in this notion is the belief that the Supreme Court does
not decide cases on the basis of ideology. Thus, state courts are
required to articulate unique state characteristics before depart-
ing from Supreme Court precedent simply so that they will be
prevented from deciding cases on the basis of mere ideological
6 77 N.Y.2d 474, 505-06, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920. 938 (1992)
(Kaye, J., concurring).
317 Id. at 505, 593 N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (Kaye, J., concurring).
318 See id. at 474, 506, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Beacossa, J.,
dissenting).
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disagreements with the current Supreme Court.
Neither of these two propositions are correct. First, non-
interpretive analysis does not protect against political decision-
making. "Non-interpretive" factors are, in fact, as capable of be-
ing manipulated for political reasons as any others. The court of
appeals's out-of-context invocation in Scott of New York's
"traditional" acceptance of the bizarre and offensive a dubious
proposition that might well surprise the residents of, say, Elmira
is an example of the judicial creation of a non-interpretive
factor.359
Even more important, however, is the palpable fact that the
Supreme Court is as political a body as any other court. Indeed,
the entire "New Federalism" movement is a response to a Su-
preme Court whose most recent members have been selected
specifically to implement a political agenda, e.g., the reversal of
Roe v. Wade. 60 While commentators routinely point out this ob-
vious fact, courts, sensitive to the charge that they are "ideologi-
cal," decline to mention it. This, perhaps, accounts for the acri-
mony of the New York Court of Appeals and the uneasy
sensation created in the reader of these opinions that the "real
reasons" underlying the decisions lie elsewhere 'than in unique
state factors. The court's anxiety is perplexing because it is only
when the Supreme Court dilutes constitutional rights that a
state court can refuse to follow. And when it acts to give broad
protection to individual rights, it is doing precisely what it was
created to do.
D. State Constitutionalism as Discourse
Professor James Gardner" 1 describes state constitutional
law today as "a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting and es-
sentially unintelligible pronouncements. 36 2 He argues that the
fundamental defect responsible for this state of affairs is the
failure of state courts to develop a coherent discourse of state
constitutional law that is "a language in which it is possible for
participants in the legal system to make intelligible claims about
"I See 77 N.Y.2d at 488-89, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
300 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
301 Gardner, supra note 11, at 761.
302 Id. at 763.
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the meaning of state constitutions. 38 3 Gardner concludes that
"the failure of state constitutional discourse reflects... a failure
of state constitutionalism itself."3 4 State constitutionalism has
failed, argues Gardner, because "[its] central premise... is that
a state constitution reflects the fundamental values, and ulti-
mately the character, of the people of the state that adopted it.
This premise, however, cannot serve as the foundation for a
workable state constitutional discourse because it is not a good
description of actual state constitutions.
'365
Gardner explains that "one of the foundational and indis-
pensable beliefs of American political and social life is that we
are a nation, which is to say that we constitute collectively a
certain community. '366 Gardner agrees with James Boyd
White36 7 that
a community is, on the most basic level "a group of people who tell a
shared story in a shared language." On this view, discourse is a critical
element of the communal relationship: The "community talks itself
into an historical identity." One way discourse accomplishes this task
is by revealing and maintaining the common values of the members of
the community.6 8
According to Gardner "[f]or Americans, discourse, values and
activities all intersect in the U.S. Constitution: it is a text, and
thus a form of discourse, its subject matter is the values of soci-
ety.... [I]t serves as a focal point for the creation and perpetua-
tion of a plausible narrative identity for the national community
and its individual members."3 19 In sum, constitutional law is
only made in a discourse that defines us as a community.
State constitutionalism is therefore a failure. State constitu-
tionalism fails first because state constitutions do not, in fact,
express anyone's most deeply held values;370 the fundamental
differences in the history and character and fundamental values
363 Id. at 763-64.
364 Id.
3" Id.
'll Id. at 823.
317 HERAcLEs' Bow 33, at 172 (1985).
3 Id. at 823 (citing KENNETH L KARsT, BELONGING IN AtmCA 28-31 (1989)).
369 Id.
370 Frequently mentioned in articles on the New Federalism is the fact that most
state constitutions are lengthy, frequently amended documents, dealing with a wide vari-
ety of trivial matters, e.g., the width of ski trails in Adirondak State Park.
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of the citizens of different states thought to justify differences in
state constitutional interpretation simply do not exist today, if
they ever did. Moreover, as Gardner points out, there is a basic
inconsistency in one group of people having two different, and
possibly incompatible, sets of "fundamental values" expressed in
two different constitutions.371
Gardner, on one level, is right: defined as discourse about
peculiar state rights and values, state constitutionalism is a fail-
ure. Gardner's framework is not the only way of judging state
constitutional discourse, however. According to Gardner, an in-
dication of the "impoverishment" of state constitutional dis-
course is that rather than developing an independent robust lan-
guage of its own, its "terms and conventions are often borrowed
wholesale from federal constitutional law. ' 37 2 Rather than as evi-
dence of impoverishment, however, on another level, this "bor-
rowing" can equally be seen as a sign that in fact there is only
one national discourse concerning our fundamental values. State
courts are simply using the parallel provisions of their own con-
stitutions as a means of registering reasoned dissent from the
Supreme Court's views and continuing a single debate that
would otherwise be entirely cut off.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators routinely disparage state courts'
continuation of debate after the Supreme Court has spoken on a
particular issue as "reactive" and "mere disagreement" on ideo-
logical or political grounds. State courts therefore often disguise
what is, in fact, reasoned dissent with invented claims of local
difference. It is this refusal to reveal the true basis for its deci-
sion that results in the type of angry and unintelligible pro-
nouncements on state constitutions in Scott and Keta which are
rightly characterized as failed discourse. When, on the other
hand, the Scott and Keta majorities meticulously detail the
shortcomings of Oliver and Burger, they invite us, like Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead, to a conversation that is democratic "in
its openness to all who learn its terms, in its continuity with or-
dinary speech, but most of all in its recognition that the essen-
3' Gardner, supra note 11, at 763.
171 Id. at 766.
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tial condition of human life that it takes as its premises are
shared by all of us.1 373
373 White, supra note 8, at 867-68.

